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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the issue of technology adaptation in a global technology 
transfer context. It proposes a knowledge-transfer perspective to analyze the underlying 
problems associated with technology adaptation. Using a practice lens, this study 
compares the knowledge system embedded in technology and that in the organization. 
Furthermore, this study extends the analysis of situated context to individual level and 
societal level. It explains how the embeddedness of knowledge system in 
organization’s individual, organizational and societal context may inhibit technology 
adaptation. Based on a Sino-German technology transfer case, this study proposes a 
framework for organizations to identify misalignments between technology and 
organization, and evaluate the feasibility of adapting those misalignments. 
Keywords: Technology adaptation, Knowledge System, Situated context, and Aircraft 
MRO. 
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OPENING WORDS 
Yanzi went to the state of Chu as an envoy for the state of Qi. As Yanzi arrived, the 
king of Chu laid out a banquet to entertain him. A prisoner was shown to the king. The 
king said: “What did the man do?” The officer said: “He is a man of the state of Qi who 
is being punished for the crime of robbery.” The king of Chu, looking at Yanzi 
tongue-in-cheek, said: “Have the people of the state of Qi always excelled at robbery?” 
Yanzi responded calmly: “I have heard that tangerine trees grow in the south of the 
Huai river, and they bear sweet tangerines (sweet oranges); but if they grow in the 
north of the Huai river, then they bear trifoliates (sour oranges). Although the leaves 
and appearances are similar, the taste is totally different. Why is it so? It is just a matter 
of the soil and water. If people growing up in the state of Qi never rob, yet when they 
enter the state of Chu, they become robbers, could it not be that it is the soil and water 
of the state of Chu that makes them excel at robbery?” (Translated with revision from 













CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Many organizations have implemented ERP packages. A significant number, 
however, have not experienced the level of expected benefits, especially those 
organizations in developing countries (e.g. Baark & Heeks, 1999; Braa & Hedberg, 
2002). In the early 1990’s, studies tended to examine the factors that inhibited IS 
adoption and technology adaptations (Boon, 1992; DeLone & McLean, 1992; Matta & 
Boutros, 1989; Sauer, 1999).  For instance, through an extensive literature survey, 
DeLone & McLean (1992) identify six main categories of success factors, including 
system quality, information quality, IS usage, user satisfaction, and both individual and 
organizational impact. Sauer (1999) categorizes 12 risk factors attributing to IS 
adoption difficulties. However, there have been criticisms that those studies failed to 
consider the differences of contexts between where the technology is developed and 
where the technology is implemented (Avgerou & Walsham, 2000).  
Thus, in the new era, more attentions have been paid to examining the influence of 
local context in technology adaptations and IS implementations (Avergou & Walsham, 
2000; Bada, 2002; Heeks, 2002; Walsham & Sahay, 1999). These studies have provided 
several suggestions and frameworks about how to make adaptations based on the 
implementing organization’s local contexts. For example, after an analyzing the 
adaptation of an IT-based organizational change program (BPR project) in Nigerian 
Bank, Bada (2002) suggests a two-level local adaptation framework, consisting of 
conceptual adaptation and operational adaptation. Heeks (2002) identifies two 
high-risk archetypes that affect technology adaptation in developing countries: country 
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context gaps and hard-soft gapes. Other studies have also demonstrated that local 
contexts play an important role in technology adaptation and IT adoption (e.g. Avergou, 
2001; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998).  
Although the implementing organization1 may successfully adapt a technology by 
considering the local contexts, we still have to admit that certain principles in the 
technology or in the organization are almost impossible to be adapted. These principles 
are embedded in the contexts. When a technology is developed, the designers have 
inscribed certain organizational principles into it (Latour, 1992). These organizational 
principles are influenced by the institutional contexts where the developers are situated, 
and reflected in technology’s features, functions and underlying principles (DeSanctis 
& Poole, 1994). DeSanctis & Poole (1994) regards those organization principles as 
technology “spirit”, which is the general intent with regard to values and goals 
underlying a given set of structural features (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994: 126).  
Meanwhile, in the implementing organization, they also have their own embedded 
organizing principles. When an organization develops, certain organizational principles 
will evolve from the institutional contexts where the organization is based in. Those 
principles can be viewed as the “spirit” of the organization and reflected in the 
organization’s rules, capacities and practices.  
The misalignment between those organizing principles embedded in the technology 
and that in the organizational may cause technology adaptation difficulties. Soh & Sia 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, I use “implementing organization” and “recipient organization” 
interchangeably to refer to organizations who adopts a new technology 
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(2004) defines the principles in the technology and in the organization as the embedded 
structures, which are reflected as procedures, rules and norms (Soh & Sia, 2004: 376). 
They emphasize that the analysis of misalignment in technology adaptation should 
consider the imposed and voluntary organizational structures, which are embedded in a 
particular institutional context.  
The study of Soh & Sia (2004) illustrates two important points: embeddedness and 
context. However, one issue that Soh & Sia (2004) study has not fully explained is the 
“spirit” in the technology and organization. The procedures, rules and norms can reflect 
the embedded principles to an extent but they are still generic. The “spirit” in the 
technology or an organization can be compared to the “personality” of a person. The 
procedures, rules and norms are like the person’s clothes and accessories, which can be 
modified, enhanced and even manipulated. But a person’s personality can only be 
understood from what he does everyday. Similarly, the “spirit” of a technology or of an 
organization can only be realized by examining individual’s situated practices. 
The “spirit” in technology or in organization is a set of organizing principles, 
which are embedded in the context and almost impossible to be adapted. In this study, 
I define the embedded organizing principles as knowledge system, as reflected in 
users’ situated practices (Brown, 1998; Ruhleder, 1996). I propose this research 
question: What are the differences between the practices embedded in the source’s 
context (i.e. the knowledge system inside the enterprise system) and those situated in 
the recipient’s context?  
This study has three specific objectives. First, by regarding technology and 
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organization as knowledge systems, this study conceptualize technology adaptation as 
an occasion of knowledge transfer. To put this inquiry into context, I examine an IS 
adoption project undertaken in a Sino-German joint venture. The purpose of adopting 
this information system was transferring the best practices in the German company. 
Second, by examining the situated practices, this study aims at explaining the “spirit” in 
the technology and that in the implementing organization. Especially, through a case 
study in aircraft MRO (Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul) industry, this study aims at 
revealing the embedded organizational principles in a MRO ERP system. Meanwhile, 
by analyzing how the situated practices are embedded in the source context and the 
recipient context, this study explains an “incompatible” situation in which the 
implementing organization cannot adapt either the technology or the organization 
configurations. Third, based on the case analysis, this study propose a three-level 
context framework for organizations to (1) identify misalignments between the  
knowledge system in technology and that in organization, (2) examine how these 
misalignments are embedded in the individual, organizational and societal context, 
and the feasibility of adapting the misalignments.  
This study is structured as follow. The next (second) section explains the 
theoretical basis. The third section elaborates how fieldwork was conducted with 
reference to data collection and analysis using the knowledge lens. The fourth section 
presents the study findings by comparing the practices of the German company (as a 
proxy for showing the embedded knowledge system in the technology, situated in the 
source side) with those practices of the Chinese company (as a proxy for showing the 
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pre-established knowledge system in the recipient side). Moreover, both parties’ 
situated contexts are analyzed with regard to individual, organizational and societal 
contexts. This is to explain how practices are emerged from each side and why a 
change of the source’s practices to adapt to the recipient’s may be challenging, if not 
impossible. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications are suggested to deepen 
our understanding of technology adaptation. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BASIS 
2.1. Technology Adaptation 
As the opening passage (“when tangerine becomes trifoliate”) suggests, the success 
of IS transfer from the source to the recipient context depends significantly on how 
well the recipient can adapt the innovation, be it a new practice or a technology, into 
its environment. Successful IS adoption normally takes the form of mutual adaptation 
(Majchrzak et al., 2000). The recipient can either change the technology to fit 
organization or change the organization to fit technology. Two bodies of literature 
examine technology adaptation difficulties: the general literature on technology 
adaptation (e.g. Leonard-Barton, 1988; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Tyre & Orlikowski, 
1994; Yetton et al., 1994) and the specific literature on technology adaptation in 
developing countries (e.g. Bada, 2002; Heeks, 2002; Kiggundu, 1990; Korpela et al., 
2000).  
The first aspect of technology adaptation is finding the appropriate timing for 
undertaking changes. For example, Tyre & Orlikowski (1994) suggest that effective 
adaptation of technology requires the implementer to identify “windows of 
opportunity”. During the windows of opportunities, the condition may be more 
conducive for undertaking technology modification. Taking a punctuated equilibrium 
viewpoint, Sabherwal et al. (2001) suggests that technology adaptation can be 
discontinuous, triggered by discrepant events. There is no certain fixed time or 
windows of opportunity for technology adaptation. Technological changes may be 
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triggered by variations in the internal or external environment. For example, new 
government regulations may induce organizations to undertake technology 
reconfiguration and business process reengineering. In contrast, Leonard-Barton 
(1988) proposes a continuous cycles of technology adaptation. A large adaptation 
cycle will follow by more but smaller adaptation cycles, which eventually results in a 
stabilized technology-organization alignment. These studies assume that users will 
continuously engage in technology adaptation. However, in reality most users may 
abort the technology before it can survive to reach the period of the “windows of 
opportunity”. In this conception, these studies also teach us little about in what way a 
technology may be aligned to an organization.  
The second stream of research addresses the technology-organization alignment 
issue. These studies examine how technology can be best adapted by the recipient 
through package modification and organizational adjustment (Hsiao & Ormerod, 1998; 
Scott-Morton, 1991; Yetton et al., 1994). Yetton et al. (1994) suggest that a firm may 
follow a certain sequence in order to align technology with different organizational 
elements, such as strategy, structure, process, and people. In different companies, the 
patterns may be different. Based on a small architectural company, Yetton et al. (1994) 
observe that IS alignment is initiated by triggering changes in role and responsibilities 
in the company, and then organizational structure and business process are changed 
accordingly. In the end, the new business strategy emerges as an outcome. In sequence, 
undertaking organizations adjustment, such as business process reengineering, in 
advance can best achieve technology adaptation (Davenport & Stoddard, 1994; Lee & 
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Lee, 2000).  
Other scholars also suggest that effective technology adaptation requires mutual 
adaptation of technology and organization (Majchrzak et al., 2000; Orlikowski & 
Yates, 1994; Orlikowski, 1996). Orlikowski (1996), for example, examine how 
technology may evolve with organizational transformation over time. In this view, 
technology adaptation is achieved through organizational improvisation within the 
local context. Gradually, the technology-organization alignment allows technologies 
to be accommodated into the local context (Majchrzak et al, 2000: 570).  
The specific literature on technology adaptation in developing countries pays more 
attention to the local context (e.g. Avergou & Walsham, 2000; Avergou, 2001; Bada, 
2002; Heeks, 2002; Robey & Sahay, 1996; Jarvenpaa, 1998; Rolland & Monteiro, 2002; 
Walsham & Sahay, 1999).  These studies have provided several suggestions and 
framework for organizations to make technology adaptation within their local context. 
For example, Bada (2002) examines the adaptation strategy of a BRP project in 
Nigerian Bank. Since BPR project is an IT-based organizational change program 
originally developed in industrialized countries, the western-context based adaptation 
process may not be compatible with Nigerian’s local context. Thus, a two-level 
adaptation model, consisting of conceptual adaptation and operational adaptation is 
proposed. Heeks (2002) identifies two gaps that affect technology adaptation in 
developing countries: country design-actuality gaps and hard-soft gaps. The author 
suggests that the framework could be used to understand the success and failure of 
information systems (Heeks, 2002: 103). 
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Through in-depth case studies, other studies demonstrate that local contexts play an 
important role in technology adaptation and IT adoption. For example, Avgerou (2001) 
examines the role of government, consortia and professional services firm in the 
adaptation process of an inter-firm system adoption in Cyprus. Robey & Sahay (1996) 
analyzes why the adoption of a same information system (GIS) has different outcomes 
in two nearby counties. They authors attribute the divergent outcomes to differences 
in four specific processes related to the implementation of the information system: 
initiation, transition, deployment and spread of knowledge.  
The technology adaptation literature has not only identified certain adaptation 
patterns but also pointed out the importance of local context. However, these studies 
have not illustrated the “embeddeness” of practices in the local context. For example, 
from the case analysis in Avgerou (2001), we know that the government power and 
the ineffective professional services contributed to the IS adaptation failure. Yet, the 
outcome may not change even if the Cypriote government improved information 
services and consortia services. The reason that led to the IS adaptation failure is the 
conflicts between the embedded transaction model (flexible specialization strategy) in 
the system with the situated transaction model (individual workshop strategy) in 
Cypriote society. The context analysis in previous technology adaptation literature 
tends to emphasize the influence from the external environment but not the conflicts 
in fundamental principles between technology and recipient organization. The 
external environment can be compared to the facilities in the universities and the 
fundamental principles can be compared to a student’s research capability.  If the 
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student was blamed for no publications, is it more important to improve the facilities 
(e.g. buying new computers or installing a new air-conditioner in the office) or 
improve the student’s research capability (e.g. reading relevant academic papers or 
attending research seminars)? The logic is similar in technology adaptation process. 
Technology adaptation difficulties are caused by misalignments between the 
principles embedded in the technology and those pre-established principles in the 
recipient organization (Soh & Sia 2004).  
2.2. Embedded Knowledge System  
Technology is not a black-box (Latour, 1987; Rosenberg, 1982). When a 
technology is developed, the designers have inscribed certain organizational principles 
into it (Latour, 1992). Normally, a technology is not custom-built for every organization. 
When the technology is being developed, the designers have to take assumptions about 
general organizing principles in the market. These assumptions will be reflected in the 
technology features, functions and goals. In other words, a new technology reflects the 
best practices of the organizations which the developers interact with most closely (Soh 
& Sia, 2005). Thus, not only features and processes are designed in a new technology, 
but also certain organizing principles are embedded in it. Meanwhile those best 
practices are influenced by the institutional context (e.g. government regulations, 
industry environment) where the reference organizations are situated in (Soh & Sia, 
2004).  
In this study, I define the embedded organizing principles in technology and in 
organization as knowledge system, as reflected in users’ situated practices (Brown, 
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1998, Star & Ruhleder, 1996). According to Tsoukas (1996), an organization can be 
considered as a “knowledge system”. For example, when we discuss the ERP 
software used by Toyota, we must not only analyze the ERP functions, but also 
investigate the “system of governance” – that is , the entire operating policies, norms, 
and routine practices that Toyota Motor Company has evolved over time (Alder et al., 
1999; Badaracco, 1991). The “knowledge system” of Toyota production may include 
the just-in-time inventory system, kanban (visibility) method, participatory labor 
relations, and immense commitment to the success of the “Toyota family” among 
affiliated companies. 
Leonard-Barton (1995) suggests that there is a repertoire of knowledge embedded 
in a technology, and the adoption of this technology also means the transfer of the 
particular physical system as well as the embedded managerial practices, people’s 
skills, and organizational values. Furthermore, the embedded knowledge is closely 
intertwined with our actions – i.e. our situated practices in a specific context (Barley, 
1986; Nidumolu et al., 2001; Orlikowski, 2000). Therefore, to align technology with 
organization can be seen as a transfer of knowledge about how to use a technology 
and about how to incorporate a technology into people’s practices within the 
recipient’s context. 
Attewell (1992) further suggests that technology adoption involves a process of 
knowledge transfer in which the recipient attempts to assimilate the knowledge 
embedded in the technology. For example, as the recipient adopts an enterprise system, 
which is initially developed based on preconfigured organizing principles, the success 
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of technology adaptation is determined by whether the embedded organizational 
practices would be in conflict with the “knowledge system” situated from the 
recipient’s context (Newell et al., 2000; Orlikowski et al., 1995; Soh & Sia, 2004). 
On these bases, one key implication of the knowledge lens is concerned with the 
analysis of the knowledge system embedded in technology (derived from the 
originator’s context) and the situated knowledge system in the organization (i.e. the 
practices established in the implementing organization). If the embedded knowledge 
is congruent with the situated knowledge, one may anticipate that the embedded 
practices may be assimilated effectively through a process of adaptation and thus, the 
high likelihood of technology adaptation success (Majchrzak et al., 2000). On the 
other hand, if the embedded knowledge is incongruent with the situated knowledge, 
one may anticipate challenges in technology adaptation (Lee & Lee, 2000; Newell et 
al., 2000).  
2.3. The Research Framework 
As explained earlier, the incongruence between the knowledge system in 
technology and that in the implementing organization will lead to technology 
adaptation difficulties. To adapt either knowledge system is not an easy task because 
they are embedded in the respective context. In particular, when the recipient 
organization is situated in a different cultural context (than that of the source 
organization – i.e. where the technology was originally developed), the difficulty of 
transferring the embedded knowledge in the information systems may raise more 
complex issues. Thus, to analyze the possibility of adapt a new technology into an 
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organization, we have to consider two issues: the knowledge system in technology 
and in organization; the contexts where the knowledge system is embedded in.
First, the knowledge system in technology and in organization can be understood 
from users’ situated practices. When users in the recipient organization choose to use 
a technology, the way they interact with technology is influenced by the “knowledge 
system” in the organization (Orlikowski et al. 1995, Orlikowski, 2000). From how 
users interact with a technology, we can understand how the embedded knowledge in 
information system is enacted from users’ actual practices in the source side 
(embedded in the technology), while how the pre-established knowledge system in 
recipient organization is enacted from users’ actual practices in the recipient side.  
Meanwhile, both the knowledge system in technology and that in the organization 
are influenced by the contexts. As explained earlier, the knowledge system in 
technology is embedded in the contexts where the technology is developed. When 
developers design the technology, they inevitably inscribe their views and 
assumptions about the world into the technology. These views and assumptions are 
influenced by the institutional context where the designers are situated (Soh & Sia, 
2005).  
On the other hand, the knowledge system in organization is also embedded in the 
context where the organization is situated. Just as the “knowledge system” in Toyota. 
It is influenced by Toyota’s organizational context, Japanese social environment and 
also Japanese engineers’ devotion to their company. Thus, even though many 
companies tried to transfer Toyota’s system, very few have ever succeeded (Alder et 
 14
al. 1999; Spear & Bowen, 1999).  
In this conception, technology adaptation cannot be detached from three different 
levels of context – relational, organizational, and institutional (Kostova, 1999; Lam, 
1997; Pettigrew, 1990). For example, in the relational context, a particular 
maintenance practice may be emerged from a specific human resource policy and 
training methods (e.g. the Toyota Way of education). In the organizational context, a 
particular work habit may be developed through intensive social interactions within a 
corporate culture. In the institutional context, a particular collaboration work pattern 
may be incorporated because of certain regulatory imperatives in a specific industry. 
Hence, an analysis into the situated context could help us better understand why a 
practice may become effective or counterproductive when it is transferred to the 
recipient’s context. 
Although these studies have illustrated the importance of context on technology 
adaptation (e.g. Orlikowski et al., 1995; Robey & Sahay, 1996; Walsham & Sahay, 
1999) they still neglect one point. Previous literature has mainly examined contexts 
from an organizational perspective, such as organizational structure, corporate 
strategies or business processes. However, in the case that technology is adopted in a 
developing country, the analysis of organizational context may not be enough. When 
technology is transferred from the industrialized countries to a developing country, 
the developing country may have different social infrastructure, government 
regulations and industry structures. Situated in such a societal context, the 
implementing organization will develop corresponding organizational culture and 
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suitable operation capacity. Meanwhile, the employees in the recipient organization 
will have particular technology frames and learning abilities, which are compatible 
with the organizational and societal contexts. Thus, neither the importance of societal 
context nor individual context should be neglected when analyzing global technology 
transfer cases. Although Kostova (1999) has proposed a three-level context 
framework in, very few researchers have applied such a framework in empirical 
studies. This study aims at filling this gap. 
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As illustrated in Figure 1, this research focus on identifying the incongruence 
between the knowledge system in technology (Attewell, 1992) and that in the 
organization (Tsoukas, 1996). I employ a practice-based conception to examine both 
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parties’ knowledge systems (Orlikowski, 2000; Schultze & Orlikowski, 2004). On this 
basis, technology adaptation difficulties were concerned with problems underlying 
transferring the knowledge system in technology to organization. To understand the 
possibility of making adaptation, I use a three-level context framework to examine the 




CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The field-based study is a naturalistic inquiry which aims to analyze the dynamics of 
technology adaptation within an organization (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Qualitative 
methods are appropriate for this study as they help characterize technology and 
organization as knowledge systems (Rosenberg, 1982; Tsoukas, 1996) through an 
analysis of work practices in a given institutional context. Such a qualitative analysis 
could shed light on the interplay of practices and contexts (Orlikowski, 2000, 2002; 
Schultze, 2000). Particularly, this study emphasized the elaboration of situated context 
so that the intended audience can understand the emergence of practices embedded in 
the technology artifact (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Pettigrew, 1990). In this way, 
qualitative methods are employed for the purpose of “theory elaboration”, which is 
used when preexisting theories offer a sound foundation for an emergent study (Lee, 
Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999: 164).  
3.1. Research Context 
This field study was based in aircraft maintenance industry. With the development 
of aviation industry, more and more emphases have been paid on the maintenance of 
aircrafts to ensure transportation security. To provide high-quality and efficient 
maintenance services, MRO (Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul) companies not only 
need technical skills but also managerial know-how to resolve maintenance problems, 
such as work-package break down, manpower allocation, parts purchasing, labor 
accounting, and etc. These maintenance problems have a direct impact on a project’s 
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Turn-around-Time, or known as TAT.  
The selected case is called SkyAir (all names presented here are disguised), based in 
Beijing, China. SkyAir was a state-owned subsidiary before the joint venture. At that 
time, SkyAir could only provide maintenance services to Soviet-made aircrafts. 
However, with the open and reform policies, these Soviet-made aircrafts gradually gave 
up their market occupation to the US- and European-made models. Since the 
management system and the maintenance methods are quite different, all the MRO 
companies in China were confronted with the pressure of building up new maintenance 
systems.  
SkyAir’s business scope included aircraft and aero-engines maintenance and 
overhaul. In comparison with other domestic maintenance companies, SkyAir had 
many preeminent advantages, such as its location (with a working area of 640,000 
square meters in Beijing) and supports gained from the Beijing municipal government. 
SkyAir, as the recipient firm, initiated a joint venture with GermanAir over a period of 
15 years. In this competitive industry, SkyAir initiated this joint venture with 
GermanAir so as to acquire capital investment and transform its maintenance 
capabilities (which was based on maintaining Russian aircraft models). For 
GermanAir, this joint venture was intended to reach Asian market and expand their 
global services network.  
During the 15 years of collaboration, GermanAir transferred both maintenance 
skills and engineering management know-how to SkyAir. A “dual-responsibility” 
system was implemented. Within the first ten years, GermanAir sent senior staff to 
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occupy the key management positions, while SkyAir’s people holding the deputy 
manager positions. In the coming five years, the SkyAir’s managers gradually took 
over the main roles and responsibilities for each function. After 1994, Chinese 
managers took over the positions to further develop SkyAir’s maintenance capability. 
In 1997, it was the first time that a Chinese manager was appointed as SkyAir’s CEO, 
which represented a success of transferring GermanAir’s management system to 
SkyAir.  
Meanwhile, SkyAir sent engineers to Germany to participate in different 
maintenance projects in order to transfer technical skills. Moreover, an education 
center, which replicated the German establishment, was incorporated to train 
technicians and engineers at all levels. As an ongoing exchange scheme, GermanAir 
had also sent technicians to SkyAir from 1989 to 1993 to help SkyAir set up a 
compatible maintenance system for US- and European- made aircrafts. With the help of 
GermanAir’s technicians, SkyAir had build up maintenance manuals, job-card systems 
and quality control systems. At this period, SkyAir could complete overhaul for engine 
RB211 and D-Check2 for Boeing 737. SkyAir also built the largest 4-bayer hangar in 
Asia and reconstructed its painting hangar. 
In 1990, for the first time, SkyAir recruited employees from the public, after 
adopting GermanAir’s human resource management system. Before collaboration, the 
main parts of SkyAir’s employees were veterans (from military personnel system) and 
                                                 
2 There are four levels maintenance check in aircraft maintenance. D-Check 
represents the highest level and A-Check represents the lowest level. 
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undergraduate students from aviation system. Adopting the new human resource 
management system meant that SkyAir no longer would implement life-long 
employment. SkyAir also implemented GermanAir’s salary structures, with M 
(Manager) level and B (Basic) level. However, the variances in each salary level were 
different and the salary scale was far below to that of the GermanAir. 
Between 1994 and 1998, more German experts were sent to SkyAir to help them 
expand the maintenance capacity. In this period, SkyAir had completed 2S4 C-Check of 
Boeing 757 for the first time (2S4 is a self-propelled mortar used in aircrafts) and by the 
year of 1994 it had performed a D-Check of Boeing 747 on its own, which was 
unprecedented in China (D-Check of Boeing 747 is the most complex maintenance 
project in MRO industry). With the two parties’ efforts and interactions, SkyAir’s 
maintenance capabilities expended smoothly and obviously. 
The other important result in this collaboration was transferring GermanAir’s 
training system to SkyAir. With the help of GermanAir’s training experts, SkyAir set up 
a new training center, SAC (SkyAir Aviation Center) to provide technical trainings to 
SkyAir’s engineers, following international training systems such as JAR-66 and 
ATA-104. Moreover, SAC provided supplementary trainings for senior employees, 
offering courses for maintaining new aircraft models. For executive managers, SAC 
provided specific business function trainings, such as project management trainings, 
workshop management trainings and equipment management trainings. 
As a technical professional school, SAC provided 3-year’s basic trainings to junior 
school or high school graduates. The basic trainings followed European JAR-66 
 21
training systems. Meanwhile, SAC also provided advanced trainings to senior 
employees in SkyAir, which lasted 1-2 years. These trainings included: introducing 
company’s regulations and updating maintenance knowledge. Normally, a qualified 
maintenance technician needed to go through 7-year’s trainings, including basic 
trainings and different levels advanced trainings. After 3-year’s basic trainings, 
technicians would get the first level certification, T1. To get the second level 
certification T2, technicians needed to have at least 2-year’s hands-on experiences in 
the workshop and pass the ATA-104 Level-3 training (a special training for aircraft 
dismantling, maintenance and overhaul).  
By 2004, SkyAir’s services had ranged from line maintenance of Boeing 737, 747, 
757, 767, 777, MD11, Airbus A340, to aircraft overhaul of Boeing 737, 747, 767, 777 
as well as overhaul of engines with as many as 8000 components. In year 2004, SkyAir 
has completed the first 5D check of Boeing 747 in the world, which represented a new 
level of SkyAir’s maintenance capability. 
However, SkyAir’s challenge was the low TAT time of maintenance work caused 
by inefficient maintenance process and ineffective project control. Therefore, another 
more important objective of this joint venture was to transfer GermanAir’s MRO best 
practices.  
To improve maintenance efficiency, GermanAir developed MROsys, an enterprise 
system, to support job-dispatch, procurement, and maintenance work scheduling. A 
MRO house typically manages three core maintenance activities: Planning, Buying, 
and Executing. At the planning stage, a planning engineer needed to negotiate with 
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the client and determine work packages for each aircraft. The planning engineer then 
engaged in job-dispatching practices, sorted out “who-should-do-what-and-when”, 
define “job-cards” (a card specifying work sequence of a particular task), and sent out 
purchasing orders to acquire required components. Accordingly, field engineers and 
technicians from different departments, such as aircraft overhaul, engine service, 
electronics maintenance, were summoned to form taskforce teams for each 
maintenance project. At the buying stage, a sourcing engineer procured the required 
parts, involving inquiring prices, selecting suppliers, gaining approvals, procuring 
parts, and disseminating parts. At the executing stage, field engineers and technicians 
collaborated to accomplish maintenance works according to the job-cards. In more 
sophisticated projects, they had to work across boundaries and gather technicians 
from different levels of job skill. These three core activities were effectively 
supported by MROsys in GermanAir.  
In October 2003, in order to improve its working efficiency, SkyAir implemented 
MROsys so as to transfer GermanAir’s best maintenance practices. The anticipation 
was to use this enterprise system to improve service quality and shorten the 
turn-around-time. However, the system did not lead to the anticipated results. Instead, 
the enterprise system, which had proved to be valuable at GermanAir, was found by 
SkyAir’s employees to be disruptive. This case offers a rich context in which to analyze 
technology adaptation issues against the background of global knowledge transfer. It is 
especially interesting to analyze technology adaptation difficulties by adopting a 
knowledge transfer perspective, as this initiative involved a serial transfer of aircraft 
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maintenance knowledge through the enterprise system. 
3.2. Qualitative Research Method 
This study used a qualitative methodology to analyze technology adaptation 
difficulties in MROsys (Walsham, 1995). The qualitative research method provides an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the subject matter. It examines social phenomena 
in the environments in which they naturally occur and attempt to understand social 
context so as to make sense of the phenomena under study (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994: 
2). Qualitative research methods provide thick descriptions of actual actions in 
real-life contexts that recover and preserve the actual meanings that actors ascribe to 
these actions and settings (Gerphart, 1993). Due to the inherent emergent 
characteristics, qualitative research is often revised at the same time it is done (van 
Maanen, 1979). The research question and theoretical perspective may be revised 
again and again as more data has been collected and more literature has been 
reviewed.  
In this study, at the beginning, I analyzed this case from a technology adaptation 
perspective (DeLone & McLean, 1992). I attempted to identify the barriers that 
inhibited technology adaptation in SkyAir. However, by knowing more about this case, 
I found that the purpose of MROsys adoption involved not only information system 
implementation but also the transfer of best practices from GermanAir. This prompted 
me to apply a knowledge transfer perspective to analyze this technology adaptation 
problem (Attewell, 1992; Lee & Lee, 2000; Newell et al., 2000; Orlikowski, 2002; 
Tsoukas, 1996).  
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During my two fieldworks, SkyAir’s employees constantly told me that the 
technology needed to be revised and cultural differences (between Chinese and 
German engineers) were the prime concerns. Meanwhile, the German managers 
always complained that SkyAir’s organizational structure should be changed. Two 
questions came to my mind: what should be changed, what should be remained, and 
could everything be changed? These questions prompted me to review more literature 
on technology adaptation (Majchrzak et al., 2000; Soh et al., 2003). A key issue was 
whether technology should be reconfigured or whether organization should be 
adjusted. Thus, the use of knowledge lens provided an alternative approach to analyze 
technology adaptation problems in SkyAir.  
3.3. Data Collection and Analysis 
The data collection and analysis followed a reiterative process. I gathered and 
analyzed data to examine knowledge system through three core practices in aircraft 
maintenance service: job-dispatching (plan), purchasing (buy), and collaborating 
(execute).  
According to the research framework in Figure 1, first, I investigated the practices 
established in GermanAir as a proxy to understand knowledge system in technology. I 
subsequently examined the practices enacted from SkyAir so as to understand the 
knowledge system in the recipient. Second, I investigated how these practices are 
embedded in both sides’ situated environments, which include individual, 
organizational and societal contexts. Third, I began to compare the two sets of 
practices and contexts, and analyze how such a transfer may incur knowledge transfer 
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problems and cause adaptation difficulties. This comparison also helped me to 
identify areas of incompatibility in these two seemingly similar MRO firms. As an 
emergent process, I paid special attention to knowledge reuse issues in analyzing 
job-dispatching practices, knowledge coordination issues in purchasing practices, and 
knowledge sharing issues in collaborating practices.  
The fieldwork was conducted over a period of one and a half years. Data collection 
involved personal interviews, onsite observations of maintenance practices, 
attendances of production meetings, and extensive documentary analyses. In total, I 
conducted 69 personal interviews in semi-structured format. Many of them were 
interviewed more than twice. Each interview lasted from 45 minutes to over 2 hours 
in length. Interviewees included both Chinese and German CEOs, division managers, 
department managers, project managers, group leaders, maintenance engineers, 
teachers in training center, and German interns (see Table 1 for details). From the 
interviews with maintenance engineers, I could understand the actual maintenance 
practices in both SkyAir and GermanAir. From the interviews with managers, I could 
understand how those maintenance practices were evolved from the individual, 
organizational and institutional contexts in both SkyAir and GermanAir.  
Apart from formal interviews, I also employed ethnographic methods to gain a 
deeper understanding of the context (Agar, 1996). To understand technology functions, 
I interviewed technical consultants who were familiar with MROsys. These 
interviews helped me understand how MROsys facilitated project management and 
procurement management. I attended various production meetings, shadowed two  
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Table 1: Fieldwork and interview schemes in Beijing and Singapore3
 Source of information SkyAir GermanAir Total 
Formal Interviews  
General Manager 1 (2) 1 (2) 4 
Marketing Directors 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 
Project managers 5 (6) 3 (6) 12 
Contextual information 
Maintenance engineers 10 (10) 6 (8) 18 
Planning Department 3 (3) 2 (2) 5 Job-dispatch practices 
Overhaul Department 2 (2) 2 (2) 4 
Procurement 
Department 
5 (5) 2 (2) 7 




1 (1) -- 1 
Planning Department 2 (2) 1 (1) 3 Collaboration practices 
Overhaul Department 5 (6) 2 (2) 8 
 69 
Other ethnographic methods Remarks 
Production meetings I have attended several production meetings 
to understand the maintenance projects and 




I have shadowed three project managers to 
understand the maintenance practices in 
SkyAir and how MROsys is used in SkyAir 
Documentation  Documentation analysis I have collected and analyzed documentation 
from SkyAir and GermanAir to understand 




I have interviewed two MROsys experts to 
understand the functions provided by 
MROsys 
Others 
Interview MRO experts I have interviewed three experts in this 
industry (from other MRO companies) to 
better understand this industry and the 
standard practices in MRO projects.  
project managers to track a typical maintenance job, and conducted site audit in 
maintenance factory to engage in free-flow conversation with the technicians and 
                                                 
3 In this table, x(y) represents the number of person I have interviewed (the total 
interview times). For some interviewees, I have interviewed more than once. 
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engineers. I visited the maintenance workshops, followed through purchasing 
processes, participated in technician training sessions (in SkyAir’s technical college), 
attended seminars held by the marketing department to understand MRO markets, and 
observed technicians’ collaboration in troubleshooting works.  
The first fieldwork was conducted in January 2004, when SkyAir just implemented 
MROsys. My investigation focused on understanding the overall aircraft maintenance 
practices and how the system was used in Aircraft Overhaul department. I flew to 
Beijing to conduct personal interviews and onsite observation. I interviewed twenty 
four managers (including planning engineers) from the Chinese side and six senior 
German managers. Each interview lasted one and a half to two hours, during which 
field notes were taken. Since there were only approximately ten German expatriate 
managers at that time, I was able to interview them more than five times to gain more 
in-depth information. 
I maintained contacts with the key staff from both the German and Chinese sides 
bi-weekly through January to September 2004. In October 2004, I flew to Beijing and 
conducted the second round of intensive interviews (one week) in SkyAir. I interviewed 
twenty-two staff members from SkyAir and the ten German expatriates (several times), 
including the CEO, divisional directors, project managers, and engineers. Each 
personal interview took two hours. I also attended various production meetings and 
shadowed two project managers to track a typical maintenance project. This helped me 
gain a deeper understanding of SkyAir’s maintenance practices with regard to 
job-dispatching, purchasing and collaborating. The main purpose of the second 
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fieldwork was to understand the contextual influences on engineers’ practices. To 
understand employees’ cognitive contexts, I asked maintenance engineers’ in both 
parties about their work habit, their most important concerns, and their opinions of 
their work. To understand organizational context, I asked division managers and 
CEOs in both parties about organizational strategy, structure and salary system. To 
understand institutional context, I asked project managers in both parties about the 
competition environment, component market and education system. These interviews 
helped me figure out how the particular practices were evolved in each context and 
why SkyAir could not simply replicate GermanAir’s practices.  
During the fieldwork, I had traced the MROsys adoption within one year’s period. I 
learned that the initial implementation was not satisfactory because the majority of 
SkyAir’s engineers were not familiar with the system functions. Although these 
implementation problems were quickly resolved through enhanced education and 
training, more fundamental problems soon arose when MROsys went online to 
support maintenance work in December 2003. For example, using MROsys, the order 
management incurred a serious delay of three to five days, and in other projects the 
delay could be weeks. This was intolerable for field engineers, as the maintenance 
work would be disrupted on all fronts, resulting in cost escalation and schedule 
slippage.  
The three core practices were the main elements of analysis: job-dispatching, 
purchasing and collaborating practices. The job-dispatching task was a prerequisite to 
maintenance project, which refereed to analyzing customers’ work package, making 
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task cards and assigning each task to engineers. In term of job-dispatching practices, I 
asked both parties’ planning engineers how they analyzed customers’ work package, 
what manuals were used to define job-cards and how they managed each customer’s 
job-cards for different aircraft. Moreover, I asked both parties why they performed the 
job-dispatching practices in such a particular way, and examined what supportive 
mechanisms were in place. For example, I noticed that GermanAir employed a 
standardization method of job-dispatching. This practice was possible because 
GermanAir could approach to tier-one airlines and establish long-term relationships. 
In this way, GermanAir’s engineers could maintain similar aircrafts models and 
establish standardized maintenance job-dispatch processes. In stark contrast, SkyAir 
employed an ad hoc maintenance method, and needed to allocate resources flexibly in 
order to maintain a diverse range of aircraft from different airlines. This was due to 
the fact that SkyAir’s maintenance capacity could only attract tier-three and walk-in 
clients.  
The second was purchasing practice, which involved buying requested components 
for maintenance projects. Effective procurement directly affected service cost and 
maintenance lead time. In terms of purchasing practice, I collaborated with both 
parties’ sourcing engineers to trace order processing procedures and examine how 
they dealt with suppliers and made critical purchasing decisions. With the same logic, 
I asked both parties why they adopted different purchasing practices. By knowing the 
organizational structure and component market in each side, I began to understand 
why SkyAir could not transfer GermanAir’s purchasing practices into its own context.  
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At last, the collaborating practice refereed to how different engineers in a 
maintenance project collaborated with each other to complete a task. In terms of 
collaborating practices, I asked both parties’ field engineers how they collaborated to 
finish the same task, how they interacted with different engineers and how the project 
managers used MROsys to control maintenance progress. The differences in their 
collaborating practices helped me understand why MROsys may cause project 
interruptions. I asked both parties’ engineers why they undertook those particular 
collaboration patterns. By knowing the engineers’ skill structure and education system, 
I could relate to why MROsys caused delays in various maintenance projects in 
SkyAir.  
One weakness of this approach was that I was unable to obtain primary data 
pertaining to GermanAir’s practice. Although I obtained rich data on SkyAir’s 
maintenance practice, I had to rely on German expatriates and Chinese managers (who 
were sent to GermanAir for technical training) to understand how maintenance was 
conducted and how MROsys was employed by GermanAir. To minimize the effects of 
this weakness, I gained permission to visit a GermanAir affiliated company in 
Singapore. This company also implemented MROsys, and followed maintenance 
practices which resembled those of GermanAir. During March-June 2004, I 
investigated the company’s inventory process and MROsys applications. This 
enhanced my understanding of MRO practices deployed by GermanAir and the way in 
which MROsys was used to facilitate maintenance work. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In the following sections, three core MRO practices are analyzed, with regard to 
job-dispatching, purchasing and collaborating practices. These three practices 
represent the most critical activities in aircraft maintenance project. In each practice, I 
first explain what GermanAir’s practices were and the underlying situated contexts. 
Subsequently, I analyze how SkyAir performed the same practice and explain the 
underlying situated contexts. These comparative analyses will pave the way for the next 
section and explore what knowledge transfer problems may be observed and why 
MROsys may fail to support maintenance work in SkyAir. 
Figure 2: Practice in GermanAir vs. Practices in SkyAir 
Practices in GermanAir Practices in SkyAir
Standard vs. Ad hoc Dispatching Practice
Centralized vs. Decentralized Purchasing Practice
Overlapping vs. Sequential Collaborating Practice
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4.1. Planning Jobs in GermanAir 
At the planning stage of an aircraft maintenance project, the service firm needs to 
negotiate with the customer in terms of maintenance scope, overhaul specification, and 
request for quotations. Once these terms are agreed by both parties, the customer will 
provide the service firm with a “work package”, which includes more than a thousand 
“job-cards” (i.e. the specification of task requirements). Each airlines company applies 
different methods to specify their job-cards – i.e. the way maintenance shall be 
executed. Adding to the complexity, each airlines company may procure different 
aircraft models, such as Boeing or Airbus. Different models of aircraft may contain 
specific conventions, specifying how maintenance tasks are organized. For example, in 
the work packages, a customer needs to clarify the scope of service, such as A-, C- or 
D-Check (D-Check is the most complicated maintenance). In addition, a customer may 
have special requirements, such as replacing the landing gear in addition to a normal 
C-Check to the aircraft. Typically, one maintenance project contains 5000-6000 
job-cards, and there are at least five working procedures in each job-card. 
The task requirements in the work package were only general descriptions. The 
concrete procedures of how to complete a maintenance task should be designed and 
arranged by MRO companies. For instance, one task listed in the work package was 
repairing the aircraft’s landing gear. But the work package did not describe how to 
repair and follow what steps to repair it. MRO companies needed to decide all the 
details in maintenance projects.  
Every MRO company had a Planning Department, which was in charge of 
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analyzing customers’ work packages, arranging task procedures, and making job cards 
for the maintenance projects. Job cards were the work manuals for maintenance 
engineers to repair the aircraft. A typical job card included concrete task descriptions, 
maintenance procedures and task sequences. One job card corresponded to a specific 
task unit in the maintenance project and included 5-9 working procedures. Planning 
engineers needed to arrange the working procedures in each job card in order to 
maximize company’s maintenance resources and shorten turn-around-time. To make 
job cards, engineers needed to use maintenance manuals and manufacturer’s manuals 
to break down regular tasks. Meanwhile, for extra tasks, planning engineers needed to 
communicate with maintenance engineers.  
If information systems could be used in this job-dispatching practice, planning 
engineers could store customers’ job cards in the information systems, which could be 
used in the future. This reuse mechanism would help MRO companies to improve job 
cards quality and TAT consequently.  
4.1.1. Job Dispatching Practice in GermanAir 
For planning engineers in GermanAir, making job cards was not a heavy burden. 
After getting customers’ work package, planning engineers first checked this 
customer’s maintenance history in MROsys. In the system, each aircraft corresponded 
to a specific number. Using this number, planning engineers could find a Masterbook 
for this aircraft. Aircraft’s Masterbook worked like a database, which had this aircraft’s 
basic information, previous maintenance histories and the previous job cards made by 
GermanAir’s planning engineers. Thus, planning engineers in GermanAir did not need 
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to make a new set of job cards but only made some changes based on the existing job 
card system. They only needed to break down a small part of customers’ work package, 
which were not included in the previous maintenance histories. When breaking down 
these tasks, planning engineers also needed to refer to maintenance manuals and 
communicate with maintenance engineers to make compatible job cards. Since most 
job cards have been already existed in the MROsys, one month was quite enough for 
them to make a set of perfectly customized job cards. At last, before giving the job 
cards to maintenance engineers, all the new job cards will be stored in the MROsys to 
complement this aircraft’s Masterbook. One GermanAir’s planning engineer said: 
We will check our MROsys first before we did anything to customers’ work 
packages. Normally, the system has a Masterbook for this customer or this 
aircraft. We only need to find what the new tasks are in this work package and 
break down this small part. 
If GermanAir needed to provide maintenance services to a new customer, the 
planning department would collaborate with project managers to break down the whole 
work package within one month. Besides making job cards, planning engineers also 
needed to collect customer’s basic information, such as market target, portfolio, 
sensitivity to maintenance quality, cost and efficiency. Also, aircraft’s basic information 
should be included in the Masterbook, such as aircraft type, flight time and 
maintenance histories. 
However, why this knowledge reuse practices could only be realized in GermanAir 
but not in SkyAir? For planning engineers in SkyAir, using MROsys was just an 
additional burden without any benefits. Why GermanAir could use MROsys to 
simplify its job-dispatching practices and shorten turn-around-time? What kind of 
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contexts in GermanAir enacted such practice? In the following part, I will explain 
GermanAir’s context from three perspectives, engineer’s work habit, company’s 
strategy and maintenance environment. 
4.1.2. Situated Contexts in GermanAir 
Individual context: German engineers were known for their preciseness and 
systematic work habit, which was reflected in their aircraft maintenance practices. For 
GermanAir’s engineers, a set of customized job cards was a prerequisite for their 
maintenance work. After they got the job cards from planning engineers, they would 
strictly follow all the steps and sequences listed on the job cards. Each maintenance 
engineer needed to sign on the job card to indicate that the task was successfully 
completed. The engineer who was responsible for the last working procedure on the job 
card needed to input all the maintenance records to MROsys and close this job card. If 
maintenance engineers discovered a mistake on the job cards, they would immediately 
stop working and inform planning engineers. Planning engineers would then come to 
the maintenance field to investigate this problem. If the job card did have a mistake, the 
planning engineers would immediately revise it and make a new job card for 
maintenance engineers. All the revise procedures would be recorded in this aircraft’s 
Masterbook in the MROsys. For GermanAir’s maintenance engineers, in no 
circumstance would they revise the procedures on the job cards by themselves. As 
commented by one GermanAir’s maintenance engineer: 
Normally, planning engineers are very careful in making job cards to ensure 
that there is no mistake. When making job cards, they will use maintenance 
manuals, follow aviation association’s regulations and consult us to understand 
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our work shop’s situations. If we find a mistake in job card, the planning 
engineers themselves will come to the field personally to find out why the 
procedures in the job cards are not compatible with our steps in the work shop 
and revise the job cards. Although this revise procedure may take some time, 
however, it may cause more troubles if we revise it by ourselves. 
German engineers’ preciseness work attitude could also be reflected in their 
understanding of time. In GermanAir, no engineer would be late for work or take a rest 
during the work time without a proper excuse. However, German engineers would plan 
their vacations and inform their managers in advance. When it was time for their 
vacations, no matter how urgent the maintenance projects were, German engineers 
would leave to enjoy their vacations. For Germans, everything should follow some 
regulations or procedures. Spontaneous revise was not accepted in every perspective. 
Since German engineers would strictly follow regulations to revise any mistakes 
on job cards, in order to avoid these revision procedures and minimize the impact on 
maintenance project, planning engineers were required to make a set of perfectly 
customized job cards before the project started. The job cards should not only follow 
the instructions on maintenance manuals but also be compatible with the situation in 
GermanAir.  
As mentioned before, any mistakes on job cards may influence future maintenance 
practices because all the job cards would be stored in MROsys and be reused in the 
future. Although companies could benefit from the reuse mechanism provided by 
MROsys, it required certain organizational principles to be compatible with this 
mechanism. In the next section, I will analyze GermanAir’s organizational context to 
explain why in such an organizational context MROsys can be used effectively.  
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Organizational context: Before looking at GermanAir’s “standardization” 
customer strategy, we will first get to know GermanAir’s maintenance capacity from 
several criteria in MRO industry. It will help us to better understand why GermanAir 
could adopt this strategy and how this strategy would influence the use of MROsys in 
GermanAir’s job-dispatching practice. 
GermanAir was one of the best MRO companies in the world, known for rigorous 
management system, high-quality and efficient services and diverse maintenance 
capacity. GermanAir was in the leading position with regard to the three criteria in 
MRO industry, maintenance capacity, locations and technology certificates. 
Regarding to maintenance capacity, GermanAir provided aircraft maintenance, 
repair, overhaul, component services, engine services and VIP services to more than 
300 customers worldwide. In aircraft overhaul services, GermanAir’s headquarter in 
hamburger focused on Boeing 747 series, Airbus 330, 310, 340 and 300-600 aircrafts. 
GermanAir’s subsidiary in Philippines provided overhaul services to Airbus 330 and 
340 series. GermanAir’s subsidiary in Budapest had the capacity to overhaul Boeing 
737 series and Airbus 320 series while GermanAir’s subsidiary in China, SkyAir 
focused on the overhaul services to Boeing 747 series. In other words, GermanAir had 
the capacity to maintain all types of commercial aircrafts. In engine services, with more 
than 50 years’ experiences in engine maintenance and overhaul, GermanAir could 
provide services to most types of engines, including PW4000, PW4100, PW4400 made 
by Pratt & Whitney and CF6-50, CF6-80C2 made by General Electric. These engines 
were the main engines used by aircraft manufactures. Moreover, GermanAir provided 
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maintenance services, line service and comprehensive component services to its 
customers. 
Regarding to locations, GermanAir had become a world wide maintenance group 
with 25 subsidiaries and affiliates, providing a broad array of services exactly tailored 
to fit each customer’s needs. These subsidiaries were also partners for GermanAir. For 
example, in conjunction with United Airlines, for example, GermanAir provided the 
highest level of technical servicing for the Boeing 777. It collaborated with SAS 
Component in providing maintenance and overhaul for the components of the Boeing 
737. The subsidiaries and affiliates accounted for a good third of GermanAir Group’s 
total sales and an appreciable share of its profits. The collaborations benefited 
customers as well. The worldwide customers now had competent people to contact in 
their own respective time zones. 
Regarding technology certificates, GermanAir had received certificates from 35 
countries’ aviation associations, including FAA certificates from Federal Aviation 
Administration, JAA certificates from European Aviation Safety Agency and CAAS 
certificates from Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore. Moreover, GermanAir got 
Certification of major modifications or completion from Design Organization Approval 
(DOA), which meant GermanAir had the capacity to modify and design equipment 
based on its knowledge and experiences. 
By understanding GermanAir’s maintenance capacity, locations and technology 
certificates, we realized that GermanAir had far beyond the stage of expending by 
looking for new customers. GermanAir aimed at providing customized maintenance 
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services with high-quality and short TAT. This goal was realized by adopting a 
“standardization” customer strategy, with long term relationships with each customer. 
GermanAir mainly provided high-quality and standardized services to a few 
first-class airlines, such as Lufthansa Airlines, Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific 
Airlines, even though it had the capacity to maintain all types of aircrafts. As first-class 
airlines, these customers were more sensitive to quality and efficiency than cost. These 
requirements could be satisfied by providing a set of standardized maintenance services 
tailored for a particular customer. For each customer, GermanAir prepared specific 
documents, job cards and maintenance manuals in MROsys to standardize the 
maintenance work and reduce turn-around-time. Meanwhile, by signing a long-term 
contract, GermanAir provided high-quality services with low cost for their customers. 
Thus, for planning engineers in GermanAir, they could forecast which customer 
they would serve and what kind of maintenance work they would provide in a particular 
year. Before getting customer’s work package, they were able to collect customer’s 
information, aircraft’s information and check this aircraft’s Masterbook in MROsys. 
Their responsibilities were not only making job cards but also improve aircraft’s 
Masterbook continuously. A good Masterbook would help GermanAir to shorten TAT, 
improve quality and reduce planning engineers’ workload as well. Since GermanAir’s 
customers were long-term customers, the knowledge in MROsys could be definitely 
reused in the future. As commented by one planning engineers in GermanAir: 
Our responsibility is translating customers’ requirements to maintenance 
engineers’ job cards and put it into the system. These customers are not 
one-time customers. They will come again and again. If the job cards are not 
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stored in the system, when this aircraft comes to GermanAir next time, we need 
to do it again. It is a waste of time and effort. 
While the knowledge was being reused again and again, the Masterbook for each 
aircraft was improved continuously. In this way, the maintenance work for each 
customer was gradually customized and standardized. 
This “standardization” customer strategy was compatible with the reuse 
mechanism in MROsys. With long-term customers, the job cards made for each 
customer could be reused again and again. Also, by providing maintenance services to 
the same customer for a few times, the practices could be standardized and also 
customized. Thus, the maintenance quality could be improved and turn-around-time 
could be reduced consequently.  
Even though a “standardization” strategy was compatible with MROsys, it was 
difficult to be transferred because this strategy was situated in GermanAir’s stable 
competition environment. In the next section, I will analyze GermanAir’s competition 
environment to explain how the “standardization” strategy was enacted from this 
societal context.  
Societal context: Compared with Asia’s fierce competitive environment, 
GermanAir was surviving in a more stable MRO environment. In the domestic market, 
GermanAir was affiliated with the German Airline (pseudonym), who was also the 
biggest customer for GermanAir. German Airline owned 145 A3x0 series aircrafts 
made by Airbus, 101 Boeing 7x7 series aircrafts made by Boeing. By year 2007, 
German Airline would have 15 A380 aircrafts, which were the biggest aircrafts in the 
world. In sum, German Airline owned 322 aircrafts, which definitely guaranteed 
 41
GermanAir’s operation scale. With a long-term relationship with German Airline, it 
was not important for GermanAir to explore new customers to keep its growth rate.  
In the international market, most high-level customers preferred to choose 
GermanAir to provide maintenance services because of its maintenance capacity, 
quality and efficiency. In addition, due to GermanAir’s good reputation, these 
customers would prefer to sign a long-term contract with GermanAir in order to enjoy a 
better price. Meanwhile, by collaborating with international airlines and setting up 
maintenance companies in other countries, GermanAir not only expanded its 
maintenance network, but also built up relationships with other airlines. For example, 
by collaborating with China Air and set up SkyAir in China, China Air had become a 
long-term customer with GermanAir. Each year, China Air would send 5 Boeing 7x7 
series aircrafts to GermanAir for maintenance. After collaborating with Philippine 
Airline, GermanAir began to provide maintenance services to Philippine Airline’s 
A3x0 series aircrafts.  
As the market leader, GermanAir did not need to explore customers but customers 
would actively choose GermanAir as their maintenance services provider. It would be 
easier for GermanAir to maintain long-term relationship with its customers compared 
to other maintenance companies. To provide high-quality services, GermanAir itself 
only served high-end customers but outsourced other maintenance projects to its 
affiliated companies. By providing repetitive maintenance services to a few long-term 
customers, GermanAir could use MROsys to make a set of customized job cards 
system for each customer. By repeating using these job cards, GermanAir could 
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standardize work procedures and shorten turn-around-time. Within these cognitive, 
organizational and institutional contexts, MROsys could be used to support MRO 
companies’ dispatching practices. 
Then why GermanAir’s job-dispatching practice cannot be transferred to SkyAir? 
Is it possible that SkyAir just copy GermanAir’s practice so that MROsys could be 
successfully adapted? In the next sections, I will analyze the job-dispatching practices 
and the situated contexts in SkyAir to explain why the embedded knowledge in 
MROsys cannot be easily transferred to SkyAir and why MROsys cannot be adapted 
into SkyAir’s practices.  
4.2. Planning Jobs in SkyAir 
As a whole, SkyAir’s job-dispatching was organized to deal with ad hoc 
maintenance for walk-in customers. SkyAir’s engineers needed to engage in a flexible 
way of job-dispatching, as repair works constantly required reciprocal adjustments. To 
understand SkyAir’s maintenance challenges, we need to look into their actual 
practices in the field. 
4.2.1. Job Dispatching Practice in SkyAir 
In SkyAir, when making job cards, planning engineers used maintenance manuals 
provided by aircraft manufacturers and regulations published by aviation associations 
to break down regular tasks, such as painting antiseptic liquid. One planning engineer 
in SkyAir described his work as: 
One month before the maintenance project starts, we will get customers’ work 
package from marketing department. I could use the maintenance manuals to 
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break down the work package to the minimum task unit. For example, one 
common task is painting antiseptic liquid to the aircraft. According to the 
maintenance manual, there are 9 working procedures in this task: disassembling 
aircraft’s ceiling, disassembling electrical wires, cleaning, checking aircraft’s 
mainframe, repairing aircraft’s mainframe, repainting, cleaning, and painting 
antiseptic liquid. The task of painting antiseptic liquid has one job card, which 
includes 9 working procedures. When I make this job card, I have to write down 
how to do each working procedure, how should do each working procedure and 
what is the sequence of these 9 working procedures. Normally, I need to make 
5000-6000 job cards for each work package. All these job cards should be 
finished within a month and give them to maintenance engineers before the 
project starts. 
Besides these regular maintenance tasks, customers might have additional 
requirements. For those requirements, planning engineers may not be able to use 
maintenance manuals. For example, customer may require replacing the landing gear in 
addition to a normal C check to the aircraft (A typical C check does not include the task 
of replacing aircraft’s landing gear). The maintenance manuals did have all the task 
procedures about C check and replacing aircraft’s landing gear but did not explain how 
to incorporate the procedures of replacing aircraft’s landing gear into a C check. Thus, 
the planning engineers needed to combine all the tasks in C check and the task of 
replacing the landing gear together based on the work situation in SkyAir, such as 
project progress, personnel availability and component purchasing lead time. It may 
take some time for the planning engineers to communicate with project managers, 
purchasers and maintenance engineers to understand the conditions in the maintenance 
workshop and make job cards which could facilitate but not impede maintenance 
engineers’ work. One planning engineer explained: 
If the customer requires a C check plus replacing the landing gear, in SkyAir, 
normally, we will do the C check first because we do not have the necessary 
metal bracket. If the old landing gear is disassembled, the aircraft needs to be 
upheld by a metal bracket. However, since SkyAir does not have such a 
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powerful metal bracket, we could only replace the landing gear when the new 
one is ready. But the purchasing lead time for a landing gear is quite long. It 
takes at least 20-30 days to buy a new one so the engineers have to generate an 
order request at least 35 days before the C check is finished. Under this situation, 
I have to put all the job cards for replacing the landing gear at the end of this 
maintenance project but write down ordering a new landing gear at one of the 
job cards for C check. This sequence is suitable for SkyAir’s condition. If other 
MRO companies who have the metal bracket, they could disassemble the 
landing gear at the beginning of the project and replace a new one in the middle 
of the project as long as the new one is ready. 
In this case, the planning engineers not only needed to be familiar with the 
maintenance manuals, but also have strong communication skills with engineers in 
other department to make compatible job cards. Normally, one maintenance project 
contained 5000-6000 job cards and there were at least 5 working procedures in each job 
card. For planning engineers in SkyAir, it was very difficult for them to finish all the job 
cards within one month, especially when sometimes they could not make job cards only 
based on maintenance manuals but had to consider the real conditions in SkyAir’s work 
shop. Thus, to ensure that all the job cards would be ready before the project began, 
SkyAir’s planning engineers tried their best to break down the work package to the 
minimum task unit and made job cards according to maintenance manuals. But due to 
the time constraints, the sequences of working procedures in each job card might not 
correspond to the maintenance procedures in SkyAir’s workshop.  
After adopting MROsys, SkyAir’s planning engineers intended to put all completed 
job cards into the system so that the job cards could be reused in the future. However, 
they discovered later that this inputting work was not only time-consuming but also 
useless. One planning engineer said: 
SkyAir does not have stable customers. We only have short-term customers. 
Today we may serve a customer from Vietnam. Tomorrow we may provide 
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maintenance service to Air Icelandic. Someday we may have to repair an 
aircraft from Philippine Airlines. It may not be useful to spend a lot of time to 
make a set of perfect job cards for this customer because you never know when 
it will come again. To input the job cards into MROsys is another heavy burden 
but no one can tell you when the job cards will be used again! 
For SkyAir’s Planning Department, they did not need MROsys. On the contrary, 
using the system could only increase their work load but no benefit. In the following 
sections, I will explain how SkyAir’s dispatching practices were enacted from the 
cognitive, organizational and societal contexts and why SkyAir could not transfer the 
embedded knowledge in MROsys. 
4.2.2. Situated Contexts in SkyAir 
Individual context: SkyAir’s maintenance engineers were more “spontaneous” 
compared with their counterparts in GermanAir. Even if the sequence of working 
procedures in the job card was not compatible with the situation in SkyAir’s workshop, 
SkyAir’s maintenance engineers would still accept the job card and find their own ways 
to finish all the tasks. One of SkyAir’s mechanical engineer said: 
One task in Boeing 747 D check is repairing aircraft’s landing gear. On the job 
card, it says there are three working procedures: disassembling landing gear, 
dissembling mainframe’s shuck and repairing landing gear. It is the right 
sequence in the maintenance manual. But if we follow this sequence, it would 
be a disaster. After disassembling the landing gear, the whole aircraft should be 
upheld by a metal bracket. However, if the mainframe’s shuck is disassembled 
when the aircraft is supported by a metal bracket, it may cause a balance 
problem because the metal bracket in SkyAir is not so powerful to support 
Boeing 747. It is possible that the aircraft may lean or fell down when the 
mainframe’s shuck is being disassembled.  
According to SkyAir’s regulations, if maintenance engineers found a mistake in the 
job cards, they should directly inform the planning engineers. The planning engineers 
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needed to revise the job cards and correct mistakes. It took at least one day for 
maintenance engineer to get a new job card. Since the lead time was too long to bear, 
normally, SkyAir’s maintenance engineers had their own way to solve this problem. 
They would still use this job card but make some sequence changes by actively 
collaborating with other engineers. For example, in the landing gear’s case, the job card 
would be given to the engineer who was responsible for disassembling aircraft’s shuck 
first and then the mechanical engineer would disassemble and repair the landing gear 
according to the job card. It took only 1-2 hour to finish all the tasks. One maintenance 
engineer commented: 
There are not only one or two mistakes on the job cards. If every job card is sent 
back to be revised and each revision takes 1-2 days, how could we have time to 
repair the aircraft! Yes, we are more flexible, sometimes flexible is good and 
sometimes it may cause troubles. But on this job card issue, our flexible way 
did save much time. 
The maintenance engineers in SkyAir were more tolerant to the job card issues. 
Even though there might be some mistakes on the job cards, they would not complain 
or criticize planning engineers. Their flexible work habit helped them to enact an 
active way to adjust the sequence of working procedures by themselves under the 
imperfect job card systems 
The Chinese engineer’s flexible attitude was not only confined to the using of job 
cards, but also reflected in other aspects, such as their appreciation of work time. The 
German CEO in SkyAir has complained: 
These Chinese engineers are so lazy. The work time in the morning is 8 to 12. 
But when I go to the work shop at 11:30, I always found many engineers have 
already stopped working. It will never happen in German. The German 
engineers never stop working unless it is time for rest. 
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However, the Chinese engineers had different opinions on this work time issue. One 
Chinese engineer noted: 
When we repair aircrafts, we need equipment and components. If these 
equipment and components are not ready, how could we repair? At 11: 30, the 
person in the warehouse told me that they cannot give me the equipment in the 
morning. I could only use it in the afternoon. Then I would have nothing to do 
in the next half hour. I would rather have lunch a bit earlier and start working at 
1:30 when I get the equipment. I also have a 2 hour break. What is the 
difference if I stop at 12 and start at 2?! 
Limited by external conditions, SkyAir might sacrifice efficiency if it required 
employees to strictly follow all the procedures. On the contrary, Chinese engineers’ 
flexible work habit would enact new collaborating and repairing practices which could 
ensure the maintenance efficiency. Thus, for engineers in SkyAir, when they got a job 
card with wrong working procedures, their first reaction was how to collaborate with 
project managers and other engineers to finish the tasks based on the existing job card 
but not to correct the job card following the formal procedures. Thus, even though the 
planning engineers in SkyAir might not have enough time to communicate with 
maintenance engineers to make compatible job cards, maintenance engineers’ enacting 
collaboration practices would solve most mistakes on job cards.  
Although SkyAir’s engineers could use these imperfect job cards to finish all the 
tasks, however, the efficiency would definitely be improved if all the sequences of 
working procedures were correct. But why the planning engineers in SkyAir did not 
have enough time to a perfect job card system? Why MROsys could not be used to 
facilitate job-dispatching practice in SkyAir. In the next part, I will explain the reason 
from an organizational strategy perspective. 
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Organizational context: SkyAir adopted an “ad-hoc” customer strategy. Since 
collaborating with GermanAir in 1989, the maintenance capability had been greatly 
improved. However, from 1999, with the development of many domestic middle and 
small MRO companies, such as TAECO and GAMECO, the development rate slowed 
down obviously. Meanwhile, the depression of aviation industry hampered SkyAir as 
well. As a developing large-scale MRO company, to maintain its leading position in 
Chinese MRO industry and explore the international market, an ad-hoc customer 
strategy would be a short-cut for SkyAir at current stage. 
As mentioned before, planning engineers needed to spend a lot of time to make a 
perfectly customized job card system. Not only did they need to use maintenance 
manuals to break down regular tasks, but also had to understand the situations in the 
work shops in order to break down customers’ special maintenance tasks. Moreover, 
sometimes, planning engineers even had to be familiar with the conditions and histories 
of the aircrafts because the aircraft’s flight time and conditions would directly affect the 
maintenance work. However, if the MRO companies kept changing customers, 
planning engineers might not have enough time to communicate with maintenance 
engineers to understand work shop’s situations or communicate with customer 
representatives to understand the aircraft’s conditions. 
Under this “ad-hoc” strategy, SkyAir could not forecast which customer it would 
serve in one year, let alone what kind of aircraft maintenance services it would provide 
to customers. In other words, SkyAir served a new customer every time. In this instance, 
SkyAir’s planning engineers only had one month to analyze customer’s work package 
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and broke down tasks to make job cards. Because of the time limit and unfamiliarity 
with customer, planning engineers might only be able to break down customer’s work 
packages roughly according to maintenance manuals. Furthermore, since most of 
SkyAir’s clients were short-term customers, SkyAir could not reach economy of scale 
by making a set of customized job cards for each client. As commented by one planning 
engineer: 
To make a set perfectly customized job cards, it takes at least two month here 
under the effort of all the planning engineers in this company. This work is 
meaningful if the customer will come back because the job cards we have made 
could be reused. But now we have 9 new customers in 10 maintenance projects, 
how could we have so much time to make each of them a new set of customized 
job card?! In addition, our department (Planning Department) not only serves 
the aircraft overhaul department. We also have to make job cards for engine 
department and maintenance department. We cannot put all the planning 
engineers into one project. 
At last, SkyAir was constrained by its own capacity. In 1990’s SkyAir had built up 
the biggest 4-bayer’s hanger in Asia, which could hold 4 Boeing 747 at the same time. 
However, with the development of other domestic MRO companies, SkyAir’s hanger 
was quite small compared with those in other companies. For example, TAECO had 
built up a 9-bayer hanger and a hanger which could hold the biggest aircraft A380 
would be built up in GAMECO before 2008. The hanger’s capacity would greatly 
influence MRO companies’ customer strategy because MRO companies could only 
serve customers when the hanger was available. Moreover, SkyAir only had the 
capability to provide overhaul services to Boeing 7x7 series aircrafts. For Airbus Ax0 
series aircrafts, SkyAir could not provide overhaul services. The constraints on 
maintenance capability and hanger capacity limited SkyAir’s customer base. To keep a 
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high growth rate, SkyAir did not have the opportunity to choose customer but only 
served walk-in customers to achieve a desired operation scale. 
Therefore, currently, SkyAir’s strategy was serving short-term customers to increase 
the customer base and build up reputations. Under this strategy, SkyAir’s planning 
engineers needed to deal with new customers almost every time. SkyAir did not have 
enough personnel and effort to make a set of customized job card system for each new 
customer. Also even though the planning engineers might not have enough time to 
make compatible job cards, the maintenance engineers would enact their own practices 
to ensure maintenance quality and efficiency to some extent. Thus, the “ad-hoc” 
strategy was compatible with SkyAir’s practices at this stage.  
Then what will happen if now SkyAir replicated GermanAir’s “standardization” 
strategy? To answer this question, we need to analyze the competition environment in 
SkyAir. In the next section, I will explain SkyAir’s institutional context by analyzing 
the competition environment. This analysis will help us to understand why SkyAir 
adopted an “ad-hoc” strategy at current stage.  
Societal context: As a developing MRO companies, SkyAir was competing in a 
fierce competition environment. From the competitor’s perspective, SkyAir was 
competing with both domestic and international competitors. China was a good 
environment for aircraft MRO because it had a big human resource market with cheap 
labor cost. After the open and reform policy, more and more international MRO 
companies began to choose Chinese partners to build up joint MRO companies in 
China. In Beijing, Air China and GermanAir collaborated to build up the first Chinese 
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MRO company, SkyAir. In Xia’men, TAECO was a joint MRO company of HAECO, 
Xia’men Aviation Industry Co. Ltd., Cathy Pacific Airways, Boeing Group, Japan 
Airlines and CAAC. In Guangzhou, GAMECO was a joint venture between China 
Southern Airlines, South China International Aircraft Engineering Co. Ltd. and 
Hutchison Aircraft Maintenance Investment Ltd. from Hong Kong. In Shangdong, 
HAECO and Shangdong airlines collaborated to set up a joint MRO company, 
STAECO. In Shanghai, China Eastern Airline and China Aviation Engineering Co. Ltd. 
had collaborated to build up Shanghai Eastern Aircraft Maintenance Limited (SEAM) 
to provide maintenance and overhaul services to aircrafts in China Eastern airlines. 
Besides these main aircraft MRO companies, recently, more and more foreign 
companies had invested in China to build up engines and component maintenance 
companies, such as Hamilton Sundstrand. With foreign investments, domestic support 
and advanced technologies, these companies had developed so quickly that they were 
even better than SkyAir in some maintenance perspective. Thus, although SkyAir was 
the first MRO company in China, it was not the best one currently. 
From a customer perspective, there were three aviation groups in China: China 
National Aviation Holding Company (CNAH) based in Beijing, China Eastern Air 
Holding Company (CEAH) based in Shanghai and China Southern Air Holding 
Company (CSAH) based in Guangzhou. Each of them had their own maintenance 
company, which were SkyAir, SEAM and TAECO respectively. Besides CNAH, most 
aircrafts in the other two aviation groups were Airbus 3x0 series aircrafts, for which 
SkyAir did not have the capacity to maintain. Moreover, due to the cost, location, and 
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competition considerations, each aviation group would always choose their affiliated 
MRO companies to provide maintenance services. Therefore, in the domestic market, 
SkyAir’s biggest customer was CNAH (also known as Air China). However, CNAH 
only had a crew of a bit more than 100 aircrafts. To ensure maintenance quality and 
efficiency, sometimes, CNAH would choose SASCO or STEngg in Singapore to 
provide high quality aircraft overhaul services. Thus, even from CNAH, SkyAir could 
only get a few projects every year, which was not enough to sustain its growth rate. 
Commented by SkyAir’s marketing manager: 
Domestic airliners prefer to choose their own MRO companies. Compared with 
other facilities, aircrafts are more difficult to more from one place to another. It 
does cost if the aircraft flies from Guangzhou to Beijing. So CSAH would 
rather choose TAECO is TAECO could provide same maintenance services as 
us, even with higher price. For CEAH, we cannot get their project because we 
do not have the capability to maintain Airbus-made aircrafts. Even though 
CNAH has 60% shares in SkyAir, it does not mean CNAH need to give all the 
maintenance projects to us. After all, CNAH and SkyAir are two different 
companies now. So we need to find customers in the international market in 
addition with those domestic maintenance projects. 
In the international market, SkyAir’s target was middle and low-end customers, who 
were more sensitive to cost than efficiency and quality. But these middle and low-end 
customers were also target customers for TAECO, GAMECO and HEACO in Hong 
Kong, who were using low cost strategies. SkyAir was difficult to keep long-term 
relationships with those international middle and low-end customers because SkyAir 
was not superior to other competitors. 
The fierce competition in Chinese MRO industry made it impossible for SkyAir to 
keep long-term relationship with its customers. SkyAir could only provide services to 
ad-hoc customers to keep growing and build up reputations. Meanwhile, since SkyAir 
 53
mainly served middle and low-end customers, who were not sensitive to quality and 
efficiency, even though the job card systems were not perfectly customized, SkyAir’s 
engineers could use flexible collaboration practices to complete all the tasks at the cost 
of a bit longer turn-around-time (a comparison of job-dispatching practice in SkyAir 
and in GermanAir is summarized in Table 2).  
After the planning engineers had completed job cards and dispatched all the jobs to 
different engineers, purchasers needed to prepare components for maintenance 
projects. The purchasing practices were quite important because whether purchasers 
could get right components at right time will not only influence projects’ 
turn-around-time but also projects’ quality. In the next sections, I will explain the 
purchasing practices in GermanAir and SkyAir.  
4.3. Buying Components in GermanAir 
Another practice in maintenance project was helping engineers to get the right 
components at the right time. In the purchasing practice, purchasers might get several 
maintenance engineers’ order requests at the same time. They needed to set priorities 
for each order request to guarantee that urgent order requests could be processed in 
the first place. Besides setting priorities, purchasers also needed to control 
components’ price and quality. Components’ cost was the main part of MRO 
companies’ operation costs. They needed to compare prices in different suppliers 
before making decisions. Similarly, components’ quality were also needed to be 
controlled because it which would directly affect maintenance projects. The most 
important thing in purchasing practice was reducing purchase lead time. Purchasers 
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needed to choose suitable suppliers so as to reduce the purchasing lead time and 
shorten TAT consequently. 
Table 2: Comparison of Dispatching Practice in GermanAir and SkyAir 
 GermanAir SkyAir 
Job-dispatch 
practice 
When planning engineers got 
customers’ work package, they first 
checked MROsys to find this aircraft’s 
Masterbook. Then planning engineers 
would break down a few new 
requirements in the work package and 
made job cards. At last, planning 
engineers would add all the new job 
cards in the Masterbook in MROsys. 
Due to time constraints, planning 
engineers could only use maintenance 
manuals to break down regular tasks 
and make job cards. The work 
procedure on job cards might not be 
compatible with the situations in 
workshop. The job cards would not be 




Maintenance engineers had strict work 
habit in GermanAir. Whenever they 
found any mistakes on job cards, they 
would go back to planning engineers to 
correct the mistakes. In order to save 
this “revise” time, planning engineers 
tried their best to minimize mistakes 
on job cards 
Maintenance engineers had a flexible 
work habit in SkyAir. Rather than 
correcting the job cards with planning 
engineers, they enacted an active 
collaboration practice to finish the 
task. Thus even though the procedure 
on job cards might not correct, 
engineers could use their flexible 
work habit to correct them. 
Organizational 
context 
Because of GermanAir’s capacity, and 
maintenance networks, GermanAir 
kept long-term relationships with 
customers. Planning engineers could 
reuse the job cards in MROsys to 
reduce time in making job cards and 
improve job cards’ quality. 
Limited by maintenance capacity, 
SkyAir adopted an ad-hoc strategy. 
They mainly serve walk-in customers. 
Planning engineers needed to make a 
set of job cars for each customer. Since 
these customers were not stable, reuse 




GermanAir was competing in a more 
stable MRO environment. In the 
domestic market, affiliated to the 
biggest airline in German, GermanAir 
could get keep stable operation scales. 
In the international market, because of 
its good reputation, most high-level 
customers preferred to choose 
GermanAir to provide maintenance 
services. Thus, it was comparatively 
easy for GermanAir to keep long-term 
relationship with their customers.  
The competitive environment in Asia 
was fiercer. To compete with domestic 
MRO companies, SkyAir needed to 
provide better services with lower 
cost. To compete with foreign MRO 
companies, SkyAir needed to provide 
high quality services with shorter 
period. Either one was difficult to 
reach at this stage. In this situation, to 
keep growth rate, SkyAir could only 
serve as many customers as possible to 
explore the market.  
In this practice, information systems could be used to facilitate information 
communication (from workshop to purchaser center and between different 
departments) and provide suppliers’ and components’ information so as to facilitate 
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decision making process. Also, provided by such necessary information, purchasers 
can improve their purchase decision’s quality. A good purchase decision could help 
MRO companies to improve maintenance project’s quality and reduce TAT.  
4.3.1. Purchasing Practice in GermanAir 
In GermanAir, the purchasing practices were centralized. First of all, maintenance 
engineers could use MROsys in the workshop to make purchase requests. These 
purchase requests generated from workshop would be automatically sent to a specific 
purchase center, called AOG (Aircraft on Ground). AOG was a 24-hour department 
with staff who were familiar with the component markets. Their jobs differed only from 
shifts (day or night shifts, etc.), rather than any chapters or domains.  
While an AOG staff received a purchase request, he would first check the 
component inventory through MROsys. If the inventory was zero, he would contact the 
maintenance engineer who generated the request to see whether the requested 
component was substitutable. If not, the purchaser would check the purchase history 
using MROsys inventory system to get purchase information such as price and 
channels. If the component manufacturers and authorized distributors did not have 
component stock or this purchaser order could not reach the minimum order quantity 
set by these two suppliers, he would choose a reliable market agent in the US 
component market. Orders could be made to suppliers as soon as he got the 
procurement information without any further approval or permission, as commented by 
one GermanAir’s purchaser: 
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Here, I can decide everything that I do. Our boss tells us you can do whatever 
you like. I can choose the best channel, decide the price and make the order. I 
don’t need anybody’s signature. I can get necessary information from MROsys. 
MROsys was used to facilitate GermanAir’s purchasing practice. On one hand, 
MROsys facilitated information sharing between purchaser center and maintenance 
workshop. Purchasers could find out the person who generated a purchase request using 
MROsys and contacted him directly. Meanwhile, the maintenance engineers could also 
use MROsys to check the status of their purchase requests. On the other hand, MROsys 
provided useful information to facilitate purchasers’ decision making process. Using 
MROsys, GermanAir’s purchasers could find out components’ histories, suppliers, 
prices, etc. It would help purchasers to reduce decision making time and find suitable 
supplier. 
But why SkyAir could not transfer GermanAir’s purchasing practice? How the 
purchasing practice was enacted from GermanAir’s contexts? In the following parts, I 
will explain German contexts from employees’ motivation mechanism, GermanAir’s 
operation scale and component markets in German. 
4.3.2. Situated Contexts in GermanAir 
Individual context: Regarding themselves as professional maintenance engineers, 
German engineers’ motivation mainly came from customers’ satisfactions rather than 
any material reward. There were two reasons. On one side, the compensations of 
GermanAir’s engineers were enough for them to have a decent life. In GermanAir, the 
average compensation was $2800 (ten times of the average compensation in SkyAir). 
Meanwhile, German engineers did not have to worry about losing jobs because of the 
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comprehensive social security system in German. Even if they lost jobs, they would 
still get at least $1000 from various insurances. Thus, engineers did not need those 
material rewards to motivate themselves. On the contrary, the spiritual rewards were 
more important for them. Before joining in GermanAir, most German engineers had 
heard about or been familiar with this company. In Germany, before starting 
undergraduate studies, high school graduates would have one year to think about which 
area or industries they were interested. After one year, students could choose a research 
direction, continuing undergraduate study or a practical direction, joining professional 
schools. No matter which directions students might take, they would choose their most 
interested majors. For those students studying in aircraft maintenance schools, they 
began to know GermanAir ever since they enrolled in those professional schools. 
GermanAir provided scholarships, joint projects and internship opportunities for 
students in aircraft maintenance schools, which helped students to be familiar with the 
company. For those students, it would be an honor to join GermanAir after graduation 
because it was one of the best MRO companies in the world. 
For GermanAir’s engineers, customers’ satisfaction was the biggest spiritual reward 
for them. Therefore, they would do everything to satisfy customers and protect 
GermanAir’s reputations. For example, during maintenance projects, if the engineer in 
a specific position could not work because of health problem, in order to keep the 
project’s progress, the project manager would voluntarily replace this engineer and 
work at his position, although he would not be paid for this extra work. As commented 
by one purchaser in GermanAir: 
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We only have one purpose, which is providing the best services to our 
customers in the shortest time. I do not care whether I have to work overtime, or 
go to the field to communicate with the maintenance engineers, or push the 
suppliers by calling them many times. I hope GermanAir’s customer will be 
satisfied because of my work. It is the happiest thing for me. 
In GermanAir’s purchasing practice, maintenance engineers would actively trace 
the purchaser requests to ensure that they could get the necessary components on time. 
The purchasers would actively communicate with maintenance engineers to understand 
the project progress to make sure that the purchasing lead time would not affect the 
whole maintenance project. Although GermanAir’s engineers and purchasers would 
not be paid for this extra work, they regarded it as a necessary part for high-quality 
maintenance project. With this professional attitude, GermanAir could simplify 
purchasing practice and reduce purchasing time with the help of MROsys. However, 
employees’ professional attitude was only a part of GermanAir’s context in support its 
purchasing practices. I will further explain how GermanAir’s operation scale and the 
component market would affect its purchasing practice. 
Organizational context: GermanAir adopted a centralized purchasing center 
structure, controlling costs from the company’s perspective. Under this centralized 
structure, all the purchase requests were sent to the same purchasing center. Purchasers 
could also combine the similar purchase requests together and get a better price, or set 
priorities to ensure that urgent purchase requests would be handled in the first place. 
This centralized structure was compatible with GermanAir’s operation scale. 
On average, GermanAir provided 10-20 aircraft overhaul services every month, 
which were most D checks to Boeing or Airbus aircrafts. There were many common 
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components in these maintenance projects. Under a centralized purchasing center 
structure, purchasers could combine these purchase requests. On one hand, after 
combining some purchase requests, GermanAir could buy components from 
component manufacturers or authorized distributors because the single order quantity 
could reach the minimum order quantity. On the other hand, because of the large order 
quantity, GermanAir could push the suppliers to reduce the price and shorten the lead 
time. 
Besides the centralized purchasing center structure, the management system in 
GermanAir also helped to simplify purchasing practice and reduce purchasing time. In 
GermanAir’s management system, it emphasized that the principal person should be 
responsible for all activities in a task. It meant that the principal person should not only 
complete the task, but also handle all the abnormities happened during his work. For 
purchasers in GermanAir, as the principal persons in the purchasing activities, they 
needed to gather purchasing information, contact suppliers and make purchasing 
decisions as well. As commented by GermanAir’s purchaser: 
My responsibilities include checking purchase histories in MROsys, finding 
potential suppliers, contacting suppliers, making purchase decisions and making 
sure that the components will be arrived on time. I am the person who is in 
charge of purchasing, so I can make all the decisions in my area, such as 
suppliers or prices. Also, if I make the purchase order, I have to take all the 
responsibilities until the component is arrived and checked. If the maintenance 
project is delayed because the maintenance engineer cannot get the component 
on time, I will be punished. 
Under this management system, in GermanAir, the decision makers in purchasing 
practice were the same persons who used the system and who were familiar with the 
component markets. Since MROsys could provide much relevant information in a short 
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time, purchasers could make an efficient purchasing decision. Meanwhile, by using 
MROsys, purchasers could follow up the purchase orders to ensure that components 
would not be delayed. 
In MRO industry, because of its inherent complexity, there would be countless 
abnormities even though engineers had followed all the regulations in maintenance 
manuals. If the managers controlled the decision making power, the maintenance 
projects would be seriously delayed because engineers chose to report whenever an 
abnormity happened. On the country, if the manager could distribute the decision 
making power to each maintenance engineer, letting them to make decisions in their 
own area, not only would the maintenance engineers’ abilities be improved but also the 
turn-around-time would be shortened. In purchasing practice, by distributing decision 
power to purchasers, purchasers in GermanAir could effectively use the information 
provided by MROsys to make purchase decisions.  
However, GermanAir’s purchasing practice could not be separated from its 
institutional context: the component market. In the next section, I will explain how the 
component market might affect GermanAir’s purchasing practice and the use of 
MROsys.  
Societal context: In the component market, there were three kinds of suppliers: 
component manufacturers, authorized distributors and market agents. For the 
component manufacturers and authorized distributors, the component qualities were 
ensured but the prices were higher. Moreover, these two suppliers would set a minimum 
order quantity for each purchase order. For example, Boeing had set a $1000 minimum 
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order quantity for each purchase order. It meant if a customer planned to buy a 
component which cost $2 per item, he needs to order 500 items at one time. Market 
agents were the most active actors in the market. They bought component overstocks 
from various channels and then sold these components to other customers. Buying 
from market agents, although the price might be cheaper and the lead time might be 
shorter, the components’ quality could not be guaranteed.  
Compared with SkyAir, GermanAir was purchasing in a bigger and more regulated 
component market. In the first place, because of GermanAir’s operation scale, most 
purchase orders could reach the minimum order quantities required by component 
manufacturers and authorized distributors. Thus, normally, GermanAir did not have to 
worry about the component quality but only the price and lead time. If it happened that 
there was no stock at component manufactures or authorized distributors, GermanAir 
would choose a big market agent with good reputation in the US component market 
only as their temporary supplier. As said by GermanAir’s purchaser: 
For us, some times we need to buy from market agents. But it does not mean 
that the price will be cheaper at market agents. On the country, sometime, it is 
even higher than from manufacturers or distributors. What we emphasize is the 
short lead time. But as you know, we also have to ensure quality. So we choose 
those big agents who have a good reputation or have relationship with 
GermanAir before. For example, we always buy urgent components from Volve, 
one of the biggest market agents in US component market. Their components 
have all the relevant documents and the same quality as those in manufactures. 
So even sometimes we have to buy from market agents, we do not have to 
worry about the quality issue. 
Actually, many MRO companies chose suppliers in the US component market. On 
one hand, US component market was a regulated market with more than 20 years 
history. It had comprehensive procedures to manage and regulate all the market agents. 
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Most market agents in the US component market had years of experiences and were 
approved by aviation associations. On the other hand, the components sold by these 
market agents had all relevant documents and as good as those sold by manufacturers. 
In fact, some big market agents bought components from manufactures and then sold 
them to MRO companies at a higher price. These market agents did not attract MRO 
companies by offering lower price but by providing shorter lead time. Therefore, even 
buying from market agents, GermanAir did not need to design an approval process to 
ensure components’ quality. When making purchase decision, purchasers only needed 
to consider the information of price and lead time, which could be provided by 
MROsys.   
After all, GermanAir’s purchasing practice was supported by their employees’ 
professional attitude, large operation scale, distributed management system and 
regulated component markets. Within these contexts, purchasers would actively trace 
purchase orders using MROsys, could make purchase decisions based on the price 
information and lead time information provided by MROsys and could communicate 
with maintenance engineers through MROsys. Without these contexts, MROsys might 
not be used so effectively. In the next section, I will explain SkyAir’s purchasing 
practice and supportive contexts. Based on these analyses, I will explain why SkyAir 
could not transfer the practice in GermanAir and adapted MROsys into their 
organization. 
4.4. Buying Components in SkyAir 
In contrast, SkyAir’s purchasing practices were characterized by bureaucratic 
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decision-making model, which invariably caused delays in the negotiation process of 
procurement. Moreover, SkyAir’s decentralized structure, which supported a 
profit-center principle, also engendered operational bottlenecks for sourcing engineers 
when a cost-centered principle was implemented.  
4.4.1. Purchasing Practice in SkyAir 
SkyAir’s purchasing centers were decentralized in different departments. According 
to the chapters in aircraft maintenance manual, purchasers were distributed to related 
departments. For example, purchasers who were responsible for chapter 20-49 (these 
chapters were related to aircraft systems) were assigned to the Department of Aircraft 
Overhaul. Their first priority was to ensure that order requests generated from the 
Department of Aircraft Overhaul were fulfilled effectively. They also needed to handle 
cross-department order requests. 
When a maintenance engineer in SkyAir needed to buy a component, first of all, he 
had to fill in the “material request forms” (MRFs) in Chinese, including task number, 
component number, component name, quantity, etc. The information on the MRFs 
would be translated into English later. Secondly, in each department, there was a 
“reserve engineer” whose responsibility was inputting information on the MRFs to 
MROsys. Due to the language and security concerns, line maintenance engineers were 
not allowed to use MROsys in SkyAir. The reserve engineer in each department would 
collect MRFs and make digital order requests in MROsys.  
Thirdly, material coordinators would come to each department to collect MRFs 
twice a day. Before disseminating MRFs to purchasers, material coordinators would 
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check MROsys to make sure that there was no stock for this particular component. 
Meanwhile, material coordinators were also responsible for checking whether the 
information on MRFs was identical with that on digital order requests in MROsys. 
After these checking procedures, material coordinators would disseminate MRFs to 
purchasers according to maintenance manuals. 
After getting both manual MRFs and digital order requests, purchasers needed to 
make an official purchase order based on information on MRFs. Purchasers would look 
for components’ information in MROsys, such as purchase history, previous prices and 
previous suppliers. Such information would help purchasers to narrow down the 
supplier base. Next, purchasers needed to send emails or faxes to all potential suppliers 
to ask for price information, which took at least 3 days. After comparing at least three 
suppliers, purchasers would make a tentative purchasing decision. Before making the 
final purchasing decision, purchasers needed to collect all relevant materials, such as 
MRFs, order requests, purchase requests and suppliers’ price information, to get 
approvals from five level managers, including group leaders, section managers, project 
managers, department managers and division managers. Order could be made only 
after all these people had approved.  
In this purchasing procedure, there were two bottlenecks that influenced the 
purchasing efficiency. First of all, this decentralized structure might influence 
cross-department collaborations. Due to the inherent complexities in MRO industry, the 
boundaries between departments were not quite clear. Every department might need 
help from other departments’ purchasers to buy components. For example, Department 
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of Aircraft Overhaul provided overhaul services to the whole aircraft, including aircraft 
structure, aircraft systems, engines, etc. In other words, Department of Aircraft 
Overhaul needs to buy component in all chapters in the aircraft maintenance manual. 
Under the decentralized structure, Department of Aircraft Overhaul only in charge of 
purchasing parts in chapter 20-49. If they needed parts in chapter 51-57 (aircraft 
structure), they had to collaborate with material purchaser in the Department of Aircraft 
Maintenance while if they needed parts in chapter 70-80 (Power Plant), they had to 
collaborate with material purchasers in the Department of Engine Services. It took 
longer time to process cross-department purchasing. As one project manager (in the 
Department of Aircraft Overhaul) remarked: 
For the components in Aircraft Systems, we can process the ordering forms in 
our own ordering subunit. The ordering time will not take too long. But we have 
no control over parts processed by other ordering units. They always say that 
they have a lot of urgent ordering forms to deal with, but they do not know how 
urgent the part is in our Department. We can do nothing but waiting. 
However, when handling cross-department purchase orders, purchasers had their 
own concerns. Since material purchasing was directly related to department’s profit, the 
procurement information was confidential to each department. In this case, when 
dealing with cross-department order requests, purchasers and customers were in two 
different departments. They could not get each other’s information from MROsys. For 
purchasers, they could not get to know other department’s project progress and hence 
did not know how urgent the order request was. On the other hand, for customer, they 
could not read the procurement information in other departments and did not know the 
processing status of their order requests. Due to the information inaccessibility, 
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purchasers did not want to process cross-department order request because it might 
increase their department’s procurement costs. Remarked by one material purchaser in 
the Department of Aircraft Maintenance: 
We do not know whether the order request is really urgent. We even do not 
know whether they really need this part. Last time, I ordered a Galley Load 
Relay (used in aircraft cabin) for the Department of Aircraft Overhaul. It cost 
about $2000. However, after I signed the contract, they told me that they have 
found an exchangeable component and did not need it. This relay became my 
overstock. The overstock would increase my department’s procurement cost 
and cut our profit. 
In this situation, in order to avoid unnecessary troubles, purchasers were reluctant to 
handle cross-department purchase orders, unless they had confirmed that other 
department did need the components urgently. 
The other bottleneck in SkyAir’s purchasing procedure was the approval process. 
After purchasers had proposed a tentative purchasing decision, they still needed to get 
five-level managers’ approvals before making orders to supplier. However, it always 
took a long time to get all managers’ signatures. First of all, these managers were not in 
their offices in most cases because they were busy with other maintenance affairs. 
Secondly, these managers were not familiar with the material market. They had to 
spend a period of time to understand the documents and even double-check with 
purchasers. Lastly, in SkyAir’s bureaucratic process, making decision was a big deal. 
Every manager would be very cautious in making the final decision so as to avoid 
troubles if some problems would occur in the future. A purchaser had expressed what 
he thought of such “approval” process: 
The approval process is regulated in our company. Sometimes, it is very quick 
as long as you can find all the managers. However, if they were having a 
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meeting, we have to wait. The approval follows a sequential process. The upper 
level manager will not sign unless all the lower level managers have signed. 
In this decentralized, bureaucratic purchasing practice, purchasers could neither use 
MROsys to facilitate communications across-department, nor use MROsys to simplify 
decision making process. But why did this purchasing practice exist? How did it enact 
from SkyAir’s contexts? In the following parts, we will explain this issue from three 
perspectives: employees’ motivation, SkyAir’s operation scale and component market 
in China. 
4.4.2. Situated Contexts in SkyAir 
Individual context: In SkyAir, employees needed material reward to motivate them. 
After collaborating with GermanAir, SkyAir transferred GermanAir’s human resource 
system, changing its original permanent employment system to conditional contract 
employment system. In the new employment system, employees lost emotional 
attachment to the company. Commented by one of SkyAir’s young engineer: 
Our General Manager always said we should “love the company as our family, 
take the company as home”. But we are only contract employees. The company 
is only a place we work for. They need my skills and I need salaries. When they 
do not need my skills, I will be kicked out without any sympathy. 
The senior employees also had job security concerns:  
Before collaboration, we are the master of the company. No matter how hard 
the work was, how late we had to work, we did not have complaints. But now, 
we are only contract employees, we do not know when we will be fired. How 
could I devote everything to the company if I do not know whether it will 
provide me a secure position? 
Without emotional attachment, employees did not have necessary self-motivation 
mechanism. SkyAir could only use external mechanism to motivate their employees, 
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such as linking employees’ bonus with their work performance. In year 2001, SkyAir’s 
General Manager decided to make each department as a profit center, and decentralize 
purchasing centers to each department. Purchasing cost would be calculated in the 
department level while employees’ bonuses would be directly related to their 
departments’ profits. Under this organizational structure, in order to increase their own 
bonuses, purchasers needed to control purchasing cost so as to increase their 
departments’ profits. In this situation, as described before, purchasers might be 
reluctant to handle cross-department order request because it might incur unexpected 
cost, which would influence their own benefits. 
On the other hand, the approval process in SkyAir’s purchasing practices was 
another way for purchasers to protect themselves. In MRO companies, purchasing cost 
was the main part of operation cost. Whether the purchasers could effectively control 
purchasing cost was an important criterion of purchasers’ work performance. 
Purchasers’ another responsibility was to control the components’ quality. In the 
component market, some suppliers were selling unqualified products. Whether the 
purchasers could ensure the component quality was another important criterion of 
purchasers’ work performance. However, as described in the previous parts, in SkyAir, 
purchasers did not have job security. They were afraid of losing their jobs because of a 
small mistake. In order to protect themselves, they needed to find some one who was 
more powerful to take the risk of controlling purchasing cost and components’ quality. 
Commented by one purchaser in SkyAir: 
Some component may cost ten thousands of dollars. As a purchaser, I cannot be 
responsible if some bad things happen, such as quality issue. If we have the 
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approval from managers, even if some thing happens in the future, it is not our 
responsibilities because we have followed all the procedures. 
For SkyAir’s purchasers, managers’ approval was a kind of “amulet” for them. 
Therefore, no matter how long the approval process might take, in order to protect their 
jobs and benefits, purchasers would still go through process in the name of “company’s 
regulations”. 
Lack of self-motivation and job security, even though using MROsys might 
increase purchasing efficiency, SkyAir’s purchasers would rather sacrifice efficiency 
but follow the existing procedures. However, SkyAir’s purchasing practice was not 
only related to employees’ motivations, but also influenced by SkyAir’s operation 
scales. In the next section, I will explain how SkyAir’s purchasing practice was enacted 
from SkyAir’s organizational context.  
Organizational context: Compared with GermanAir, the operation scale in SkyAir 
was quite small. Even in the Department of Aircraft Overhaul (the biggest department 
in SkyAir), normally, there were only 2-3 maintenance projects in one month (in 
GermanAir, there would be 10-20 projects in one month). Meanwhile, these 2-3 
maintenance projects might deal with different types of aircrafts, which require 
different components. If the purchasing practices were centralized, neither could 
SkyAir benefits from large scale purchasing, nor could SkyAir shorten purchasing time. 
Moreover, the decentralized purchasing center structure also brought SkyAir benefits 
which could not be realized in a centralized purchasing center structure. 
First of all, it would be easier for project managers to control purchasing process if 
the purchasing center was decentralized in each department. By communicating with 
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maintenance engineers, project manager could know when the project needed a 
particular component and which suppliers’ components had the best quality. If the 
purchasing center was located within the operation department, it would also be more 
convenient for project manager to communicate with purchasers, telling them how 
urgent the purchase request was and whether the component’s quality could meet their 
maintenance standards. This direct communication would help purchasers to narrow 
down supplier base, control component quality and reduce purchasing cost. One project 
manager said: 
Using this decentralized purchasing center structure, I can control most parts of 
purchasing practices. As the users, we know which component is good, which is 
bad and which suppliers’ product is good in quality and cheap in price. If the 
purchaser is in the same department as we are, I could easily find him and tell 
him our experiences of using these components. If we need an urgent 
component, I could push them by visiting their purchasing center everyday. 
Since we work for the same department, it would be easier for us to 
communicate and collaborate. 
Moreover, in the decentralized purchasing center structure, purchasers were only 
responsible for purchasing components in a few chapters on maintenance manuals. By 
focusing on a specific area, purchasers could be familiar with a particular component 
market and build relationship with a few big suppliers so as to get better price in the 
future purchasing practices. 
Besides the operation scale, the management system in SkyAir also influenced its 
purchasing practice. As we know, SkyAir was a state-owned MRO company before this 
collaboration. One characteristic of state-owned companies was the centralized 
management system. Decisions could only be made by managers. Line maintenance 
engineers could not be involved in the decision making process even though they were 
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the users or the persons who were familiar with the market. This management system 
mostly remained the same after collaborating with GermanAir. In the purchasing 
practice, even though purchasers were mostly familiar with the component market, they 
could not be the decision maker. In this centralized management system in SkyAir, the 
decision maker could only be high level managers. As commented by one department 
manager: 
In SkyAir, engineers’ responsibilities are follow managers’ instructions and 
execute the decisions. Even if the decision was wrong, engineers should also 
execute without any hesitation. If the engineer follow his mangers’ instruction 
but lead to a bad result, it is the responsibility of the decision maker (manager) 
but not the engineer. 
In this centralized management system, line engineer would rather choose to report 
to managers than making any decision. In the purchasing practice, purchasers had to 
report five level managers before making orders.  
The centralized management system not only influenced SkyAir’s purchasing 
practices, but also reflected in other maintenance practices. As told by one German 
manager in SkyAir: 
Some days ago, one of my Chinese engineers sent a replacement component to 
the warehouse. But the employees in the warehouse refused to take this 
component because he lost the relevant documents by mistake. Then this person 
took the component back and asked me to handle it. When I went there, I found 
the warehouse manager (Chinese) was already there, waiting for me. At last, I 
explained to him and asked him to take the component first. I promised we 
would prepare another set of relevant documents and gave the documents to 
them by the end of that day. Then the warehouse manger said something to his 
employee and asked him to take the component. In my opinion, it is a waste of 
time and effort to take the component back and forth. The warehouse could 
definitely take the component, indicating that some documents were missing. 
My employee could go back to prepare a new set of documents and send them 
back to the warehouse as soon as possible. The engineer cannot make any 
decision. Whenever some thing happens, they would come to you (manager) 
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and ask for your instructions. It is not what our German do but I find Chinese 
managers like it. 
In SkyAir, it had become a regulation for engineers to ask for managers’ instructions 
whenever they encountered any problems. In purchasing practices, although 
purchasers were familiar with the market and could get enough information from 
MROsys, they were still required to ask approvals from managers. This approval 
process could not be easily replaced by MROsys and transferring this information 
system could not easily change SkyAir’s management system, which has existed for 
at least 20 years.  
Besides the influence of SkyAir’s operation scale and management system, 
SkyAir’s purchasing practice was also influenced by the institutional context in China. 
In the next section, I will explain SkyAir’s institutional context from two perspectives: 
the salary system and the component market. By analyzing the salary system in China, 
we could understand why SkyAir adopted a decentralized purchasing center structure 
and by analyzing the component market, we could understand why SkyAir needed to 
keep this approval process.  
Societal context: First, SkyAir’s purchasing practice was influenced by the salary 
system in China. In most state-owned companies, employees’ compensations consisted 
of two parts, basic salaries and monthly bonuses. The basic salaries were decided by 
employees’ position, education background, length of services, etc. In the big 
state-owned companies and those government controlled companies, to reduce the gap 
between rich and poor, it was regulated that the differences between employees’ basic 
salaries should not be so big. Normally, the difference between two adjacent levels of 
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employees’ basic salaries was within $20. The main part of employees’ compensation 
came from the monthly bonus, which was related to employees’ work performance. As 
described in the previous part, in SkyAir, one purpose of setting a decentralized 
purchasing center was to relate purchasers’ bonuses with their work performance, 
which was indicated from departments’ profits. 
In SkyAir, there were two categories of employees’ basic salary: B (basic) for 
engineers and M (Manager) for managers. In the category of B, there were 10 levels, 
with the difference of $10 between any two adjacent levels. The junior engineer could 
get the B3 basic salary after they join SkyAir. Then their basic salary would be 
increased by 1 level every year. In this salary system, even after 7 years’ of work with 
rich experiences, the senior employees could only get $75 more than the junior 
engineer every month. However, as described in SkyAir’s individual context, SkyAir’s 
employees pay much attention on their compensations. How could SkyAir keep those 
experienced employees by providing them attractive compensations? The answer was 
bonus. It was said that employees’ bonuses were related to their work performance. 
However, there were too many abstract criteria to evaluate employees’ work 
performance, especially in a service company. Therefore, bonus has become a channel 
that managers praise a few employees whom they appreciated. However, to avoid 
dissatisfactions from other employees, managers had to design a proper mechanism to 
rationalize the bonus system. In SkyAir, they used a decentralized purchasing center 
structure. In this structure, purchasers’ bonuses were related to their departments’ 
profits. If they could help their department to reduce purchasing cost, their personal 
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compensation would be also increased. It was a rational bonus distribution mechanism. 
However, if SkyAir adopted a centralized purchasing center structure, purchasers’ 
performances could not be easily differentiated. Dissatisfactions might rise if the 
bonuses were not distributed fairly. For SkyAir, the decentralized purchasing center 
was not only useful for most purchasing practices, but also a fair mechanism to 
distribute purchasers’ bonuses. 
Another factor that influence SkyAir’s purchasing practice was the component 
market in China. The components sold by market agents might be cheaper but the 
relevant documents might not be completed. In other words, the components quality 
could not be guaranteed if they were brought from market agents. Therefore, for middle 
and small sized MRO companies, how to design a proper mechanism to control 
component quality was an important issue in purchasing practice. 
SkyAir was only a middle-size MRO company with small operation scales. It could 
not take the risk to reach component manufactures’ minimum order quantity. Thus, 
SkyAir chose market agents as its main suppliers. For the international market agents, 
since the custom procedures were quite complex in China, it might incur unnecessary 
delays. In order to avoid the delay in custom, SkyAir normally chose domestic market 
agents. 
However, since the component market in China was not mature yet, there were many 
market agents selling unqualified components. In order to control the component 
quality, SkyAir needed to set strict decision making process to ensure that these 
unqualified components would not go into SkyAir through back doors. Also due to 
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SkyAir’s centralized management system, the final purchasing could only be made by 
high level managers no matter how long the procedures might take. Thus, the long 
decision making procedure in SkyAir’s purchasing practice was a necessary 
mechanism to control the component quality in Chinese component market. 
In SkyAir, purchasers would not actively use MROsys to trace purchase orders. On 
one side, they would not be paid for this extra task. On the other hand, if they made 
any mistake in the process, they might lose jobs, which was not bearable. Thus, even 
though MROsys was transferred to SkyAir, there was no need to use the system to 
facilitate communications between departments and between employees. Also, for 
purchasers, in order to avoid risk, they would rather follow a long approval process 
than making purchase decisions by themselves. This approval process was compatible 
with SkyAir’s management system and Chinese component market as well. (A 
comparison of purchasing practice in SkyAir and GermanAir is summarized in Table 
3). 
After job-dispatching and purchasing, maintenance engineers started to repair the 
aircraft. During the maintenance project, how engineers collaborated with each other 
would influence project management methods and the duration of the maintenance 
projects. In the next sections, I will explain the collaborating practices in GermanAir 
and SkyAir.  
4.5. Executing Maintenance in GermanAir 
During the maintenance project, maintenance engineers in different disciplines 
needed to collaborate with each other to complete one working procedure. The 
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maintenance task and working procedure were the same but the collaboration patterns 
were different in each MRO company, which is influenced by employees’ knowledge 
structure, social status and education system. Some MRO companies have an 
overlapping collaboration pattern, which means engineers work together to complete 
certain tasks.  
Table 3: Comparison of Purchasing Practice in GermanAir and SkyAir 
 GermanAir SkyAir 
Purchasing 
practice 
Order requests generated by 
maintenance engineers would transfer 
to purchasers directly by MROsys. 
Purchasers worked in a centralized 
center to handle order requests. They 
would use MROsys to get information 
and make purchase decisions by 
themselves. No further approvals 
were required. 
The Order requests would be 
distributed by material coordinators to 
purchasers working in different 
departments. Purchasers needed to ask 
all the potential suppliers for price 
information. Before making final 
decision, purchasers needed to get 
approvals from five level managers.  
Situate Context   
Individual 
context 
GermanAir’s purchaser would 
actively trace purchase orders because 
their motivation came from 
customers’ satisfactions. Thus, they 
would use MROsys to reduce 
purchase time, improve decision 
quality, and communicated with 
maintenance engineers to ensure 
components quality 
SkyAir’s purchasers might not trace 
purchase orders because they would 
not be paid for this job and they might 
lose jobs if they made any mistake. 
Thus, MROsys could not be used to 
facilitate communication between 
departments and to avoid risks, they 
would rather go a long approval 




A centralized purchase center was 
compatible with GermanAir’s 
operation scale. It would help 
GermanAir’s to reduce purchase cost 
and lead time. Also, in GermanAir’s 
distributed management system, even 
the final purchase decisions should be 
made by purchasers.  
A decentralized purchase center was 
compatible with SkyAir’s operation 
scale. It would help project managers 
to control most purchasing practices. 
Also, in SkyAir’s centralized 
management system, all the decisions 
should be made by managers, even 
though line engineers were more 
familiar with the market. 
Institutional 
context 
Compared with SkyAir, GermanAir 
was purchasing in a bigger and more 
regulated component market. Even 
when buying from market agents, 
GermanAir did not have to worry 
about quality. Thus, GermanAir did 
not need any control mechanism to 
control components’ quality but just 
consider price and lead time. 
Because of long delays in custom, 
SkyAir mainly buy components from 
domestic market agents. However, due 
to the concerns in component quality, 
SkyAir had to design a proper 
mechanism to make sure that clone 
component would not go into 
company through back doors. 
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While in other MRO companies, engineers may follow a sequential collaboration 
pattern, which means each engineer is responsible for one task and all the tasks are 
finished in a one by one sequence. The differences in engineers’ collaboration pattern 
will influence TAT and project management methods. An information system can help 
project managers to make project plans (such as Gantt Chart) and control certain 
critical tasks. 
In this session, I will explain the collaborating practice in GermanAir and SkyAir by 
focusing on the antisepticise procedure4 and discussed the contexts that support these 
practices as well. 
4.5.1. Collaborating Practice in GermanAir 
In maintenance projects, antisepticising was a basic working procedure, which 
meant that all maintenance projects needed to complete this procedure and there were 
no high technical risks if engineers strictly follow maintenance manuals. This working 
procedure consisted of 9 steps, disassembling aircraft’s ceiling, disassembling 
electrical wires, disassembling sound insulation board, cleaning, checking aircraft’s 
mainframe, repairing aircraft’s mainframe, repainting, cleaning, and painting antiseptic 
liquid.  
In GermanAir, the antisepticise procedure would be divided into four main sessions: 
disassemble, check & repair, paint and antisepticise. In each main session, there were a 
few steps. In the disassemble session, mechanical engineers with specific certificates 
                                                 
4 Antisepticise is a basic maintenance procedure to prevent corrosions on aircraft 
mainframe 
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would disassemble aircraft ceilings, electrical wires and sound insulation board. After 
disassembling all the accessories, mechanical engineers would clean the aircraft to 
prepare for the work in the next session. Next, engineers from quality control 
department would collaborate with engineers in the aircraft mainframe department to 
check the status of the aircraft and make necessary repairs. Since the check & repair 
session was a critical task in the antisepticise procedure, project managers would 
arrange enough time for this session to ensure maintenance project’s quality. In the 
third session, painting engineers would repaint the aircraft after it was repaired. Before 
painting antisepticise liquid, painting engineers and antisepticising engineers would 
collaborate to clean the aircraft thoroughly. During these four sessions, there were two 
cleaning processes, which were finished by all the engineers together.  
In GermanAir’s antisepticising procedure, the task interfaces would not affect the 
project’s progress. On one hand, all the disassemble tasks were completed by one group 
of engineers. The disassemble tasks were not divided by the aircraft’s accessories, but 
by the characteristics of the tasks and the necessary certificates. On the other hand, in 
GermanAir, project managers did not have to disseminate simple tasks to a specific 
engineer. Engineers who were in charge of the previous or the next tasks would 
collaborate to complete them. In the antisepticise procedure, other than completed by 
specific cleaning engineer, the mechanical engineers would do the first cleaning work 
after disassemble accessories. Also, the second cleaning task would be completed by 
both painting engineers and antisepticising engineers. Their collaborations followed an 
“overlapping” pattern.  
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In this overlapping collaboration pattern, project managers in GermanAir could 
identify critical work path and make project arrangement using functions in MROsys. 
For example, in the antisepticise procedure, the critical task was the check & repair 
sessions. Not only did this task need to be completed by engineers from two different 
departments, but also the tasks required longest time. However, for those simple tasks, 
as cleaning, project managers did not have to pay much attention to them. Project 
managers in GermanAir could benefit from using MROsys to manage project progress 
and shorten TAT by controlling the critical tasks. 
Similar with other practices in GermanAir, the collaborating practice was also 
difficult to be transferred. It was enacted from GermanAir’s own contexts, such as 
engineers’ knowledge structure, the task division, compensation level and German 
education system. In the following sections, I will describe GermanAir’s contexts to 
explain how the overlapping collaboration practice was enacted gradually. 
4.5.2. Situated Contexts in GermanAir 
Individual context: Besides the horizontal task divisions in maintenance areas, 
GermanAir also had five levels vertical task divisions, ranging from 1 (very easy) to 5 
(very difficult). The level 1 to level 3 tasks were comparably easy jobs, such as 
loosening or tightening screws or cleaning aircrafts. These jobs could be done by any 
field engineers. For tasks in level 4 to 5, such as disassembling and reassembling 
complex instruments or system checking, specific certificates were required. These 
tasks should be assigned to a specific engineer with necessary certificates. Such flexible 
task divisions expanded the knowledge structure of GermanAir’s engineers. Those low 
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level tasks provided a platform for engineers to communicate. Engineers could chat 
with colleagues and discuss problems they encountered. In the process, engineers were 
able to obtain knowledge not only in their own fields but also in other domains. 
Through this informal communication, engineers’ knowledge was expanded and the 
knowledge structure of GermanAir’s engineers was overlapped.  
Communication also furthered cooperation. With expanded knowledge, engineers 
would prefer working together with colleagues in other disciplines. In one way, the 
overlapping collaboration could improve working efficiency. A good example was the 
engine dismantlement procedure. This procedure was divided into three task units 
according to maintenance manuals: removing the cover, cutting the electricity and 
hanging the engine, which were performed by engineers in mechanic group and 
electronic group. In GermanAir, engineers from these two groups worked together on a 
same platform in the whole progress. Low level tasks (level 1 to 3) were done by any 
person who saw it. Specialists were only needed when it came to high level tasks, such 
as cutting the electronic connection of the engine cover and checking inner circuits. It 
normally took GermanAir 1 hour to complete this procedure compared with 2-3 hours 
in other MRO companies. 
In another way, engineers themselves could also benefit from the overlapping 
collaboration. The expended knowledge would improve engineers’ maintenance ability. 
For example, in trouble-shooting, GermanAir’s engineers could discover the trouble 
points more quickly and correctly than SkyAir’s engineers. GermanAir’s engineers had 
worked together with SkyAir’s engineers in a trouble-shooting project for Boeing 747’s 
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entertainment system. After checking all the functions according to maintenance 
manuals, they did not find any problems. Chinese engineers suggested that they could 
exchange the components in another Boeing 747 aircraft to this aircraft to test which 
components were broken-down. It might take much time but it was possible. However, 
German engineers refused this suggestion. As said by one German engineer: 
Exchanging components may solve the problem. However, only a part of the 
problem will be solved in this way. The reasons for entertainment system 
problems are various. It may even caused by other operating systems. We could 
not only focus on the entertainment system. 
Stick to their own opinions, German engineer believed that the problems in 
entertainment system might be caused by other operating systems. At last, they found 
out the root problem was in the navigation system. If German engineers did not have 
the knowledge in navigation system, they would not understand how the functions in 
navigation system would affect the entertainment system. If they did not collaborate 
with engineers in navigation system, they would not gain knowledge in this area. The 
overlapped knowledge structure helped GermanAir’s engineers to discover problems in 
a structured way while the benefits would encourage engineers to further collaborate 
with other engineers to enhance their knowledge structure.  
Project managers also benefit from engineers’ overlapped knowledge structure. 
Because of engineers’ overlapped knowledge structure, engineers would collaborate to 
complete those uncritical tasks to make sure that these simple tasks would not affect the 
project’s progress. For project managers, they only needed to control the tasks in level 
4-5, using MROsys to identify the critical work path. For example, in the antisepticise 
procedure, the critical tasks were disassemble, check & repair, repaint and antisepticise. 
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As long as project managers controlled activities in these four tasks, the procedures 
would be completed smoothly. Thus, the critical path in GermanAir was much shorter 
than that in SkyAir. 
Sharing knowledge with other colleagues not only expands employees’ knowledge 
structure, but also brings material benefits to GermanAir’s employees. 
Organizational context: The overlapping collaboration practice not only expended 
German engineers’ knowledge structure, but also brought material benefits to them. 
GermanAir adopted the same salary system as SkyAir but the difference between any 
adjacent two levels was quite big. The 8-12 levels in B class were for experts in 
GermanAir. Their salaries could be as high as senior managers.  
To become an expert was the target of all engineers in GermanAir. However, as an 
expert, the engineer not only needed skills in his own area but also be familiar with all 
the tasks which were related. These experts were called “old foxes” in GermanAir. 
Because of their wide range of knowledge, they could discover maintenance problems 
in trouble-shooting process quickly and correctly. For example, in a trouble-shooting 
project for a Boeing 747 aircraft in SkyAir, after finishing all functional tests, engineers 
found no signals in aircraft’s altimeter (equipment to calculate aircraft’s altitude). They 
tested the altimeter and the navigation system. Even the electrical system was checked 
but still no progress was made. Unable to find out the problem, those engineers decided 
to replace all the components on this aircraft with another Boeing 747 aircraft to detect 
which components were the trouble maker. Although the replacement work might take 
much time, money and energy, it seemed that it was the best way at that time. Just 
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before starting the replacement work, a German expert heard about the problems that 
SkyAir encountered in this project. He suggested that maybe Chinese engineers could 
check the metal washer under that altimeter. Since there was no better solution, Chinese 
engineers followed this German expert’s suggestion and replaced a new metal washer. 
To their surprise, the altimeter stared to work. After this project, the German expert told 
those Chinese engineers that since the metal washer was just under the altimeter, any 
abrasion or rust on this metal washer would affect the altimeter’s functions. Actually, 
the small metal washer was the trouble maker in this case.  
To gain such experiences, engineers not only needed fundamental knowledge in 
aircraft maintenance, but also experiences in all areas of aircraft maintenance work. 
Such knowledge could not be found in any maintenance manuals. It could only be 
gained in practical work with collaborations with engineers in other areas.  
These “old foxes” in GermanAir had good compensations and they were respected 
by all engineers and managers. When making job cards, planning engineers would ask 
for those experts’ idea about the work practices in GermanAir’s workshop. When 
making project plans, project managers needed to consult those “old foxes” about their 
opinions in project progress. Even when making organizational strategies, 
GermanAir’s managers would invite those experts for a discussion. Thus, for German 
engineers, collaboration with others would not only expand their knowledge, but also 
bring their material and spiritual benefits. These benefits would further motivate 
engineers to collaborate with others so that TAT would be reduced. 
Societal context: The German way of collaboration was decided by their knowledge 
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structure, which was affected by the whole German education system. German 
education system differs from Chinese education system in that it emphasizes student’s 
opportunities to practice. Such emphasis could be understood though three perspectives: 
social qualification process, enterprise-school relationship and instructional design. 
For the German qualification, what counts most was experience. Diploma or 
certificate was not that important. For example, some German managers working in 
SkyAir have not even entered a university. They started their career as workers and got 
promotion for excellence in their performance. For enterprise-school relationship, the 
education system worked closely with industry and their instructional design and 
teaching materials were tailored to the market demands. At the same time, enterprises 
shoulder strong responsibility for education. They established joint research projects 
with universities, as well as provided scholarships and internship opportunities. Every 
year, GermanAir would plan to offer internship or part-time job for students, and even 
send them to branches abroad. One German intern in SkyAir told us: 
My major in university is mechanics. We learn academic knowledge in the first 
two years, but we must spend 4 hours each week to do experiments in 
laboratories. For the rest two years, we spend most time to work part time in 
companies. Universities provide plenty of opportunities for company internship 
and of course, we will find some by ourselves. For example, I will do some part 
time job every vacation and will deliberately pick up some companies related to 
my major, so as to accumulate some experience, and also earn some money. In 
this way, as soon as I get a real job after graduate, I can be readily familiar to it. 
When German students were active in doing part time job, German enterprises were 
also willing to offer such opportunities. On one hand, they regarded training students as 
responsibility apart from paying taxes, and on the other, they developed a good human 
resource base through these internship programs. 
 85
In German education system, students did not enter university immediately after 
high school, but would spend one year performing either their military service or 
community service. A lot of students worked several years before going to university. 
In GermanAir, a typical engineer’s career developed in this way: graduating from 
GermanAir’s tech-school at 17 or 18 and then working in GermanAir as a worker. After 
a couple of years, they returned to the education system and entered a university (at the 
age of 23 or 24). He then went back to GermanAir after graduating and at this time, he 
possessed both theoretical knowledge and experience and thus, his maintenance skills 
progressed swiftly and shortly. 
Under German education system, academic knowledge intertwined with practice so 
that students could understand what and why they learnt. Its education was not tailored 
to such detail as a certain job position, but emphasized much on good learning habit and 
learning ability. Students hold systematic and comprehensive knowledge and their 
experience of practice also enabled them to do real work. When they graduatde, they 
could handle their work without extra trainings. 
GermanAir had a similar training center as SkyAir. The difference was the training 
courses. Since German education system was excellent in training students to have both 
knowledge and experience at the same time, it was not necessary for this training center 
to conduct any basic technical skill classes. The training center in GermanAir provided 
courses which mixed basic and advanced level, lasting 10 weeks altogether. In these 
classes, practice accounted 40% of the total time. Different from SkyAir’s “knowledge 
first” strategy, teaching and practice in GermanAir’s training center occurred at the 
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same time. When a student touched the knowledge of a new model, trainers would 
bring him to workshops and perform skills on the real machine. In the meantime, 
trainers’ experience enabled them to show some know-how to students so that they 
could have a sound understanding. 
The emphasis on practice also enhanced an “overlapped” knowledge structure 
among GermanAir’s engineers. Having a sound foundation of systematic knowledge, 
they were able to accumulate experiences in different areas. The German intern in 
SkyAir told us: 
My first job in GermanAir was to repair aircraft systems in aircraft system 
department. One year later, I was rotated to planning department to compile job 
cards. Then, I became a troubleshooting engineer to do testing before delivering 
the aircraft. Now I am sent to SkyAir for a 5-month internship and will become 
a project manager when I’m back. The knowledge and experience I learn from 
all these jobs are important to manage a project. 
German education system enabled GermanAir’s engineers to possess enough 
experience from practice as well as the capability to learn even at the beginning of their 
career. With such experience and capability, they could not only adjust to a new 
working environment efficiently, but also handle different jobs and broaden their 
knowledge scope during collaboration. Under these circumstances, project managers 
were able to make full use of MROsys’s project management functions to identify the 
critical path of each maintenance project and would be full informed of the 
maintenance progress. 
4.6. Executing Maintenance in SkyAir 
In SkyAir, engineers from four departments were needed to complete the 
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antisepticising task. First of all, engineers from aircraft cabin department would be 
responsible for disassemble aircraft’s ceiling and sound insulation board. However, 
between these two steps, engineers from aircraft system department needed to 
dissemble electrical wires. After these disassembling tasks, cleaning engineers from 
aircraft cleaning and painting department would do a thorough cleaning to the aircraft. 
Engineers from quality control department would be responsible for checking the status 
of this aircraft in the next stage and engineers from aircraft frame department would do 
necessary repairs accordingly. Painting engineers would repaint the aircraft when the 
repair work was finished and cleaning engineer would do another thorough cleaning 
before engineers from aircraft frame department paint the antiseptic liquid to the 
aircraft. 
4.6.1. Collaborating Practice in SkyAir 
This task involved engineers from four departments and their steps were interlaced. 
How to coordinate these engineers, collaborate with four departments and make a 
proper work arrangement was a problem for project managers. First, the disassembling 
activities were completed by engineers from two departments. Although both of these 
two departments were within the aircraft overhaul division, due to the limit in engineers 
and the influences from other maintenance projects, the collaboration would still affect 
the project’s progress. As commented by one project manager: 
Although there are two steps for engineers from aircraft cabin department, since 
the two steps are not successive steps, the group of engineers may be assigned 
to another project after they disassemble the ceiling. When it comes to 
disassemble the sound insulation board, we may have to wait until they have 
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finished the tasks in the other project. Considering these situations, it may take 
two days to do the disassemble work, including one day for waiting, maybe. 
After the disassembling activities, the aircraft status needed to be checked by 
engineers from quality control department and the following repair work would be 
finished by engineers from aircraft frame department. The collaboration between these 
two groups of engineers was more difficult. As said by one project manager: 
If it is difficult to coordinate engineers in our aircraft overhaul division, it is 
worse to collaborate with quality control department. They always say that they 
have lots of things to do, asking us to follow their schedules. At last, the 
schedule is compatible with their work progress, but not suitable for the 
maintenance project’s progress. 
However, since the steps of checking and repairing were the critical steps in the 
antisepticise procedure, project managers needed to arrange enough time for these two 
steps. Normally, the coordination with engineers in quality control department might at 
least take two days in the project. 
During the antisepticise procedure, the other two steps were thorough cleaning. 
Even though it was a simple task, however, since every task was assigned to a specific 
engineer in SkyAir, the collaboration with cleaning engineer in the antisepticise 
procedure was also an issue for project managers.  
In SkyAir, every task was assigned to a specific person. The collaboration followed 
a sequential pattern, which meant each task would begin only when the previous task 
was finished. In a maintenance project, there might be many steps in a working 
procedure. If each step needed to be finished by different departments, the coordination 
and collaboration would take much time.  
Even though SkyAir had adopted MROsys, project managers could not benefit from 
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using it. MROsys has provided project management functions, such as Gantt chart to 
help project managers to identify the critical pass in a project or a working procedure. 
However, in SkyAir, tasks were completed in a sequential progress. Every task 
interface might have collaboration problems and cause project delays. Under this 
situation, each task needed to be given enough time so as to deal with unexpected 
collaboration problems. Thus, for SkyAir’s project managers, the project’s progress 
was controlled by people, not controlled by a system or Gantt chart. 
Although SkyAir could transfer an information system, it could not change 
engineers’ collaborating patterns because these collaborating patterns were enacted 
from SkyAir’s cognitive, organizational and institutional contexts. In the following 
sections, I will explain these three contexts from employees’ knowledge structure, 
SkyAir’s promotion system and Chinese education system separately.  
4.6.2. Situated Contexts in SkyAir 
Individual context: To understand employee’s collaboration practice, we need to 
first examine employees’ knowledge structure. Employees could do tasks as long as 
they have such knowledge. To understand knowledge structure in SkyAir, we need to 
understand the composition of SkyAir’s employees first. There were two groups of 
employees in SkyAir, veteran and undergraduates from aviation universities. Before 
collaboration, SkyAir had taken in many veterans. These veterans had good work habit, 
such as hardworking and strictly following instructions. These work habits were 
compatible with SkyAir’s centralized management system. However, these veterans 
did not have professional aircraft maintenance trainings. Only a few veterans had some 
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technical training, such as aircraft ground services. They mainly gained practical 
knowledge in their work position gradually. Sometimes, they could be experts in a 
particular area after years of work but their knowledge and experiences were confined 
to their own area. They were not familiar with tasks in other positions. Thus, during 
collaborations, the veterans could finish their own tasks quickly and smoothly but they 
might not be able to work with other engineers to complete tasks in other areas due to 
their knowledge constraints.  
The second group of employees in SkyAir was undergraduates from aviation 
universities. As a company affiliated to Chinese aviation group, SkyAir took many 
undergraduates from aviation universities. Although these undergraduates had 
comprehensive theoretical knowledge, because of the limitation in universities’ 
education structure, they had very little practical knowledge. For example, a student 
major in aircraft engines might understand the principles of repairing engines, the steps 
of repairing an engine but he did not understand the relationship between repairing 
engines and maintaining. Thus, for these undergraduates, they were good at the work 
which they had learnt during their undergraduate study but they were not good at 
collaborating. 
From the composition of SkyAir’s employees, we could understand that the 
employees’ knowledge structure follows a sequential pattern, which meant, knowledge 
was stored in the organizational according its business process. Each employee 
mastered necessary maintenance knowledge in his own area. A sequential collaboration 
would link each employee’s knowledge and complete the maintenance project. 
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Organizational context: Another perspective that influences collaboration practice 
in SkyAir was the salary level system. SkyAir followed GermanAir’s salary system 
after their collaboration and divided to two major categories: M (Manager) class and B 
(Basic) class. M stands for managers and B for maintenance engineers. Under M and B 
class, employees’ salaries were divided into different sub-levels according to 
experiences, technical level and positions.  
Although the payment structure in SkyAir was the same as that of GermanAir, the 
major difference lay in the salary amount. While all maintenance engineers received a 
B-level salary, the salary differed according to the skill level and experience. However, 
the difference was so tiny in SkyAir that an experienced engineer earned only slightly 
more than an apprentice. An engine-maintenance engineer told us about the structure: 
There were 12 sub-levels under the B-level salary. Engineers’ salary falls 
between level 8 to 12, while maintenance engineers earn only the salary 
between 1 to 8. Normally when an engineer comes in, his gets the third level 
salary which will increase one level each year afterwards. One level accounts 
for $20 and it takes 5 years to reach level 8. 5 years are enough to make an 
expert if the engineer works hard on a certain area and an expert means a very 
high salary in other companies. 
At the beginning of collaboration, SkyAir provided salaries above the average level 
in the industry and thus a job in SkyAir could mean not only a steady source of income, 
but a life of quality as well. However, with the implementation of China’s open policy, 
the salary level increased in most companies. Additionally, with the growing of the 
aerospace market in China, this industry gradually became a high-profit one and the 
salary level sharply raised in most companies in this industry. Therefore, SkyAir’s 
salary level fell behind. A project manager told us: 
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At the very beginning, our salary level was competitive. At that time everybody 
gets a couple of hundred, and 400 in SkyAir means quite a decent number. But 
with the blooming of market, salaries of other companies grow much faster than 
ours. Looking around now, our salary is definitely low. Even those Air China 
guys can earn more. 
When foreign capital companies entered the market, they provided high salaries and 
fascinating welfare to attract experts. For example, a really good engine maintenance 
engineer could earn four times more outside SkyAir. A manager from the engine 
maintenance department told us: 
Some big companies, such as GE, earnestly want these experts. They provide 
high salaries and good welfares. We engineers can earn 3000 here, but 12000 
outside even as startup salary. The turnaround rate of our department is 200%. 
We have 20 engineers now but have 56 engineers left in the past two years. 
Under these circumstances, SkyAir engineers turned to attend exclusively to their 
own jobs and collaboration with colleagues was of no importance. Although 
collaboration increased efficiency, yet it did nothing to increase their personal profit. 
During our interview processes, we found that engineers consistently felt that the 
winning strategy for their development in SkyAir was to become an expert in a certain 
area, which indicated either a chance to be promoted within SkyAir to enjoy M level 
salary and better welfare, or a better job at foreign capital companies outside.  
Another factor that influenced collaboration practices in SkyAir lies in the Chinese 
educational system which directly influenced the knowledge structure of the SkyAir 
people. 
Societal context: As stated above, we analyzed the knowledge structure of SkyAir’s 
employees and found that the character of their knowledge structure is “sequential”. 
Such knowledge structure actually reflected the whole China’s education system. 
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Chinese schools emphasized academic training and teaching, and learning were 
mostly done in classrooms. Students thus had very limited chances to practice. This 
educational context could be explained though two perspectives: social qualification 
process and enterprise-school relationship. In China’s qualification system, formal 
education was most important and thus diplomas and certificates, which accounted for 
formal education and qualification, were keys to employment and salary level. Even 
engineers’ promotions were related with these qualifications and years of working. 
Students needed to deal with numbers of exams to get such a diploma, which might be 
of no use to their job. And when they spent time on exams, they trade off their 
opportunities to practice. Therefore, students tended to stick to a narrow area and work 
hard to get certificate paper in return in order to pave their way for future. 
For enterprise-school relationship, these two parties did not have direct 
communication. This meant that human resource development was separated from 
university education. In western countries, enterprises offered a variety of practicing 
opportunities for students, e.g. holiday and graduate internship, and establish joint 
research projects and scholarships. This would not only guide universities to fit their 
instruction design to the demand of enterprises, but also facilitates recruiting. For 
example, in Japan, enterprises set out to search personnel at high school and then 
trained these students accordingly to develop their manners and loyalty to the company. 
On the contrary, Chinese enterprises recruited passively. They did not have the 
custom to “order and customize” human resource from education system and held little 
responsibility on education. As a result, what schools taught was not in relevance to 
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what enterprises needed. Universities divided students to different majors. Although it 
was allowed to take credits from different majors, it was not recommended. 
Consequently, students in universities only learnt the basics in one subject to handle 
exams, which was in fact of little help to real work. An engine maintenance manager 
mentioned: 
University students have a diploma and nothing else. Two days ago, we asked a 
student to design a plan as we were to fix an engine, but he told me that he 
majored in maintenance but knew nothing about testing the maintenance result. 
Hey, the most important thing to fix an engine is testing! What can you do 
without even knowing the basics? It seems our enterprise should fit those 
universities and dismantle our working procedures, one procedure correspond to 
one major in university. 
The maintenance of aircrafts was complex and each procedure related to others. One 
mistake of one procedure could lead to a chain of problems. SkyAir hoped to raise their 
maintenance skills and knowledge by recruiting university students, but as they were 
limited to their majors, they only saw problems within their own scope of working and 
were unable to control the project as a whole. Thus, the maintenance job had to be 
divided into detailed procedures and each had to be assigned to particular person. In this 
case, a project manager had to take time to coordinate all working interfaces.  
Therefore, even if project managers were able to use MROsys, he could never 
foresee which step would cost most time or which interface would cause error. When 
non-critical steps could also result in serious delay, it was not possible to control the 
project process by critical path control function provided by MROsys’s project 
management system (a comparison of collaborating practice in SkyAir and 
GermanAir is summarized in Table 4). 
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Table 4: Comparison of Collaborating Practice in GermanAir and SkyAir
 GermanAir SkyAir 
Collaboration 
practice 
In GermanAir, only tasks requiring 
certain expertise would be assigned to 
engineers with specific certificates. Other 
simple tasks would be completed any 
engineer. Engineers followed an 
overlapping collaboration pattern. Project 
managers could use MROsys to identify 
critical work path and control projects’ 
progress 
SkyAir’s engineers followed a 
sequential collaboration pattern. 
Every task should be assigned to a 
specific person. Tasks were 
completed in a one-by one sequence. 
Every task might be a bottle neck in 
the whole project. Project manager 
could not use MROsys to identify a 
critical path. 
Situated Context  
Individual 
context 
German engineers collaborated together 
to complete tasks in level 1-3. In the 
process, engineers were able to 
communicate with colleagues in other 
disciplines, obtaining knowledge not only 
in their own fields but also in other 
domains. This informal communication 
expended engineers’ knowledge structure 
to an overlapping model.  
SkyAir engineers’ knowledge was 
confined with their work area. They 
could do excellent job in their own 
area but have little knowledge of 
other disciplines. The knowledge 
structure in SkyAir was a sequential 
model, with each engineer 




GermanAir’s salary system encouraged 
engineers to learn knowledge in different 
areas and became an experienced expert. 
The experts in GermanAir had good 
compensations and were highly 
respected. These material and spiritual 
benefits would further motivate engineers 
to collaborate with others to gain new 
knowledge. 
In SkyAir, an engineer could get 
high material rewards only by 
becoming an expert in a particular 
area. SkyAir preferred engineers to 
be proficient in one area but not be 
familiar with many areas. Under 
this salary system, engineers chose 




German education system emphasized 
student’s opportunities to practice. 
During practices, students can apply 
knowledge into practical work and gain 
knowledge in other disciplines. Such 
knowledge could help them to choose 
collaborate or work together with others 
during actual work.  
The education system in China 
emphasized academic training. 
Teaching and learning are mostly 
done in classrooms. Although 
employees learnt much in college, 
without practice, it difficult for them 
to apply knowledge in their own 
work, let alone tasks in other 
discipline 
In summary, GermanAir’s “standardization” job-dispatching practice, “centralized 
and autonomous” purchasing practice and “overlapping” dispatching practice were 
enacted from the individual contexts of strict work habit, professional work attitude 
and overlapping knowledge structure, the organizational contexts of standard 
customer strategy, centralized purchase center, distributed management system and 
diversity-oriented promotion system, and the institutional contexts of stable 
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competition environment, mature component market and practice-based education 
system. During the continuous use of MROsys, these practices were gradually 
embedded and become the assumptions of effectively using the system.  
However, when MROsys is transferred to SkyAir, since the recipient organization 
is situated in the individual contexts of flexible work habit, material motivation 
system and sequential knowledge structure, the organizational contexts of ad-hoc 
strategy, decentralized purchase center, centralized management system and 
expert-oriented promotion system, and the institutional contexts of fierce competition 
environment, clone component market and teaching based education system, the 
enacted practice were “ad-hoc” job-dispatching practice, “decentralized and 
bureaucratic” purchasing practice and “sequential” collaborating practice. The 
situated practices in SkyAir were conflict with the embedded practices in MROsys. 
Meanwhile, because of the huge differences between the contexts, it is difficult for 
SkyAir to either customize technology or reconfigure organizational practice to 











CHAPTER 5. KNOWLEDGE PROBLEMS 
5.1. Planning: Knowledge Reuse Problems 
MROsys provided stable database to store job cards and useful functions to revise 
and manage job cards. It assumed that job cards would be saved in the system and could 
be reused in the future. It corresponded to a standardization strategy which had stable 
customers. Thus, whenever the MRO company provided services to an incumbent 
customers, planning engineers could make small changes on the existing job card 
system to increase maintenance efficiency. In GermanAir, situated in a comparatively 
stable market with long-term customers, planning engineers could forecast which 
customers they would serve and what kind of maintenance services they would 
provide in a year. By making a Masterbook for each aircraft, they could reuse the 
Masterbook to analyze customer’s package. During the knowledge reuse process, the 
Masterbooks in MROsys were complemented continuously, which would improve 
planning engineers’ future efficiency. However, these functions might not be useful for 
MRO companies using an “ad-hoc” strategy. Serving different customers every time, it 
might not be profitable to spend much effort and time to make good job card systems 
and store them in MROsys. The knowledge stored in MROsys could not be reused in 
the future because different customers used different job cards systems. Even though 
SkyAir could transfer the MROsys, however, because of the fierce competitive 
environment and the “ad-hoc” strategy they adopted, they could not benefit from the 
knowledge reuse functions provided by MROsys.  
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On the other side, for SkyAir, to successfully adapt MROsys, they might need to 
revise their “ad-hoc” strategy to a “standardization” strategy so that the knowledge in 
MROsys could be reused. However, a “standardization” strategy was not compatible 
with the competitive environment in Asia. If adopting a “standardization” strategy at 
this moment, SkyAir might lose most of their customers to other competitors, which 
was unbearable for SkyAir.  
5.2. Buying: Knowledge Coordination Problems 
One important function in MROsys was facilitating communication between 
different departments and providing useful information to reduce decision making time. 
In GermanAir, purchasers could use MROsys to coordinate order requests from 
various departments so that urgent order request could be processed in the first place. 
Moreover, they could use MROsys to get necessary component information to 
facilitate their decision making process so that the purchasing time and project’s 
turn-around-time would be reduced accordingly. However, in SkyAir’s purchasing 
practice, the procurement information was confidential to each department. Only 
purchasers and high-level managers in this department could read their department’s 
procurement information. Procurement information in MROsys was controlled by each 
department. The situated information sharing mechanism in SkyAir was in conflict 
with the embedded information sharing information mechanism in MROsys. Using 
MROsys could only worsen the disconnection between the customers and the purchaser, 
resulting in longer ordering time in cross-department purchasing. On the other hand, 
although MROsys could provide useful information to purchasers, however, since the 
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decision makers were managers not purchaser, the information could not be used to 
simplify decision making process and reduce purchasing time. Even though SkyAir 
could transfer the MROsys, the knowledge sharing mechanism provided by MROsys 
could not benefit SkyAir’s practice.  
GermanAir’s purchasing practices were enacted from a context with 
self-motivation mechanism, centralized purchasing center structure and mature 
component market. Within this context, GermanAir’s managers could centralize all 
the purchasing practices and let purchasers to make purchasing decisions by 
themselves. However, in SkyAir, with external-motivation mechanism, decentralized 
purchasing center structure and a less controlled component market, SkyAir needed to 
set proper mechanism to control most purchasing practices and ensure components’ 
qualities. If SkyAir adapted their practice to adopt MROsys, not only engineers might 
lose motivation and project managers might lose control of purchasing practices, but 
also clone components might enter SkyAir through back doors, which was detrimental 
to maintenance services.  
5.3. Executing: Knowledge Sharing Problems 
MROsys, designed to support efficient project management, was perceived as 
disruptive in SkyAir’s sequential job dispatch system. MROsys provided project 
management functions, such as Gantt Chart. It assumed that certain critical work path 
should exist in maintenance project so that project managers could use tools and 
functions to control those critical tasks and project progress. These assumptions were 
compatible with the practices in GermanAir. In GermanAir, by assigning tasks in 
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level 4-5 to specific engineers, project managers could control critical tasks in level 
1-3 and reduce total TAT. However, in SkyAir, since every task should be assigned to a 
specific person, no one could predict what would happen in any work interface. The 
critical path might not be identical in each maintenance project. Project managers may 
be able to find the critical path during the project but could not identify it using the 
MROsys. Even though SkyAir could transfer MROsys, since it could not transfer 
GermanAir’s knowledge structure, promotion system and education system, SkyAir 
could not transfer the knowledge embedded in MROsys, which is the collaboration 
practice in GermanAir.   
With engineers’ overlapping knowledge structure, organization job division system 
and German “practice-based” education system, GermanAir’s maintenance engineers 
enacted an overlapping collaborating practice, which was compatible with the 
assumptions in MROsys. However, in SkyAir, under Chinese “teaching-based” 
education system, engineers formed a “sequential” knowledge structure. Meanwhile, 
employees’ “sequential” knowledge structure helped them to get both explicit and 
tacit rewards from SkyAir or from other organizations. Thus, SkyAir’s engineers 
enacted a sequential collaborating practice, which was compatible with SkyAir 
engineers’ sequential knowledge structure, organization promotion system and 
Chinese “teaching-based” education system. Although SkyAir could transfer MROsys, 
they were not able to adapt engineers’ knowledge structure, organization promotion 
system and societal education system so as to successfully adopt the information 
system.  
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When the information system was transferred to SkyAir, the physical body was 
successfully implemented. However, transferring the embedded knowledge system 
was not easy, especially when the recipient organization was situated in a 
heterogeneous context. When MROsys was transferred to SkyAir, since the situated 
“ad-hoc” customer strategy contradicted with the “standardization” strategy 
embedded in MROsys, SkyAir could not reuse the knowledge stored in MROsys to 
improve planning activities’ efficiency. In buying practice, with a decentralized 
purchasing center structure and an immature component market, SkyAir’s purchaser 
could not use MROsys to coordinator information between maintenance engineers or 
managers to reduce time. In executing practice, since SkyAir’s engineers followed a 
sequential collaboration pattern, without knowledge sharing between engineers in 
different disciplines, tasks were completed in a one-by-one sequence. No one could 
predict what would happen in each task. This situation made difficult for project 
managers to use MROsys to control critical activities in maintenance project and 
reduce project’s turn-around-time. Thus, when transferring the embedded knowledge 
system from technology to the recipient organization, knowledge reuse problems, 
knowledge coordination problems and knowledge sharing problems may incur (as 







Table 5: Knowledge Problems in SkyAir 
Practice Knowledge Problems 
Planning Knowledge reuse problems: MROsys provided a stable database to store job cards 
and useful functions to revise and manage job cards. It assumed that job cards would 
be saved in the system and could be reused in the future. It corresponded to a 
standardization strategy which had stable customers. However, this assumption 
contradicted with SkyAir’s situated “ad-hoc” strategy. Even though SkyAir could 
transfer the physical system, SkyAir could not benefit from reusing the knowledge 
stored in MROsys. At this stage, SkyAir might not be able to build up long-term 
relationships with their customers because of the fierce competitive environment. 
Also, engineers’ flexible work habit would enact a new collaboration pattern correct 
the mistakes on job cards to some extent 
Buying Knowledge coordination problems: One important function in MROsys was 
facilitating communication between departments and providing useful information 
to shorten decision making process and improve decision quality. However, in 
SkyAir’s purchasing practice, the procurement information was confidential to each 
department. SkyAir’s purchasers and engineers could not coordinate information 
using MROsys to reduce purchase time. Moreover, although MROsys could provide 
useful information to purchasers, however, since the decision makers in SkyAir were 
managers not purchaser, the information could not be used to simplify decision 
making process and reduce purchasing time. 
Executing Knowledge sharing problems: MROsys, designed to support efficient project 
management, was perceived as disruptive in SkyAir’s sequential job dispatch 
system. MROsys assumed that engineers had a overlapping collaboration pattern, 
sharing knowledge with other colleagues. Thus, easy tasks could be completed by 
engineers’ overlapping collaboration. Project managers could use tools and 
functions in MROsys to control those critical tasks and project progress. However, 
this assumption contradicted with SkyAir’s practice. In SkyAir, following a 
sequential collaboration pattern, engineers would not share knowledge with others. 
Tasks were completed in a one-by-one sequence. No one could predict what would 
happen in each work interface. The critical path might not be identical in each 
maintenance project. Project managers might be able to find the critical path during 
the project but could not identify it using the MROsys. 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study offers an analysis of technology adaptation difficulties from a 
knowledge perspective. Especially, this research extends the analysis of context in 
technology adaptation and stresses the importance of situated contexts in which 
human actors’ practices are enacted. In this study, I conceptualize technology and 
organization as knowledge systems, as reflected in users’ situated practices. The 
adaptation difficulties can be understood by the incongruence between the knowledge 
system in technology and that in the organization. However, the traditional adaptation 
practices may not be applicable because both the knowledge systems are embedded in 
respective individual, organizational and societal contexts.  
6.1. Theoretical Implication 
This study examines a failed technology adaptation case. When organization adopts 
a technology, there will be three situations. In the first situation, the embedded practices 
in the technology align with those in the organization. In such an “alignment” situation, 
the technology adaptation can focus more on the replication of systems by complying 
with certain technical standards and managing adaptation risks (Markus et al., 2000). In 
the meantime, the recipient pays its attention to removing contextual barriers and 
improving unfavorable conditions (DeLone & McLean, 1992; Markus & Soh, 2002).  
In the second situation, the organization may choose an inappropriate technology 
which results in under-utilized, delayed or rejected adoption. In such a “misalignment” 
situation, mutual adaptation is required to assimilate technology into the organizational 
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environment and to arrange resources internally in support of the alignment (Miles & 
Snow, 1986; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Soh et al., 2003; Yetton & Sauer, 1997). The 
recipient particularly needs to accommodate the technology into it local context so that 
mutual adaptation can be achieved (Heeks, 2002; Shoib & Nandhakumar, 2003; 
Weisinger & Trauth, 2003). 
An important but less-explored area is the third condition where the recipient adopts 
a set of seemingly aligned practices supported by technology but in fact the underlying 
organizing principles are incompatible. In this occasion, mutual adaptation is most 
likely not possible, because any organizational adjustment requires a fundamental 
change in the recipient’s situated context, which may involves a fundamental 
transformation of the recipient’s customer acquisition strategy, service capability, 
decision-making model, collaboration pattern, deep-rooted organizational structure, 
and sometime the condition of labor market nation-wide. In this circumstance, 
modifying the technology to fit in an organization is improbable (e.g. as if a small-sized 
suit cannot fit in a sturdy person), and adjusting organizational arrangements to fit the 
technology also becomes impractical (e.g. as if one asks a sturdy person to loss weight 
over night to fit in the trouser, or chop off a part of his arms to fit the sleeves). As such, 
an implicit dimension of adaptation difficulties lies in the way we understand the 
characteristics of situated context. This is a point suggested by the opening story of 
“When tangerine becomes trifoliate” – a situation in which we need not only to 
examine the misalignment of technology-organization but also investigate the work 
contexts where the source and recipient are situated (i.e. the soil which the tangerine is 
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grown).  
As Gidden (1990) rightly suggests, the fundamental resolution to technology 
adaptation need to involve an effort to “re-embed” the global system (i.e. the 
generalized practices embedded in technology) into the local context (echoing 
Nidumolu et al., 2001; Orlikowski et al., 1995). The possible efforts to “re-embed” 
global system into local context will be discussed in the practical implication section. 
In addition, this practice-based conception provides a viable way to extend the 
existing knowledge-lens analyses to examine the knowledge system in technology and 
in organization (cf. Attewell, 1992; Newell et al., 2000; Robey et al., 2002). This case 
study addresses this issue and suggests that the problem of technology adaptation can 
be examined through a comparative analysis of the source’s and recipient’s practices, as 
a proxy to understanding their respective knowledge systems. With an emphasis on 
practices and situated contexts, we may analyze technology adaptation difficulties 
through knowledge problems (cf. Sambamurthy & Subramani, 2005). In SkyAir’s case, 
we come to appreciate that the adaptation of MROsys from GermanAir had given rise 
to problems in relation to knowledge reuse (standardization vs. improvisation model of 
job-dispatching practices), knowledge coordination (autonomous vs. bureaucratic 
model of purchasing practices), and knowledge sharing (overlapping vs. sequential 
model of collaborating practices). Hence, when these incompatible practices 
(standardization job-dispatching, autonomous purchasing, and overlapping 
collaboration) are imposed to the recipient’s context, the technology adaptation 
difficulties can be anticipated. 
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6.2. Practical Implication 
With an emphasis on the situated context, this study contends that it may not be 
easy to replace the recipient’s business processes directly with those of the 
originator’s. A complete revamp of the recipient’s knowledge system is neither easy 
nor preferable. In addition, the effort of restructuring, reengineering, and cultural 
re-orientation may not necessarily lead to better technology adaptation, but instead 
may result in more operational disruptions (cf. Majchrzak et al., 2000; Robertson et 
al., 2001). The practical insight is that even though the condition of technology 
adoption is favorable and technology functions are effective, the recipient may 
implement a technology that is totally unsuited to its pre-established knowledge system. 
Consequently, more knowledge transfer problems may arise and technology adaptation 
difficulties may ensue. 
Based on the case analysis, this study proposes a framework for organization to 
identify the misalignments between their own knowledge system and the embedded 
knowledge system in the technology, and examine the feasibility to make adaptations 
before the organization chooses to adopt a technology. Currently, organizations tend to 
adopt a technology without modification, which is called a “vanilla” approach, to 
minimize risk (Sumner, 2000). But after the technology is adopted, many 
misalignments will be identified, which requires much effort and money to adapt. 
Those misalignments are caused by the differences between the technology developer’s 
contexts and the organization’s context (Soh & Sia, 2005). Previous technology 
adaptation literature believes that such misalignments can be adapted through a certain 
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pattern (e.g. Leonard-Barton, 1988). However, in reality, some misalignments are 
socially embedded and impossible to adapt. Understanding those misalignments will 
not only facilitate future technology adaptation, but also save unnecessary cost (Soh & 
Sia, 2004). 
In the first place, the recipient organization need to compare the knowledge system 
in the technology with their own situated knowledge system to identify misalignments. 
The knowledge system consists of those main practices in the organization’s business 
process, such as the job-dispatching, purchasing and collaborating practices in aircraft 
maintenance industry. Generally, the knowledge system can be analyzed from four 
perspectives: strategy, structure, process and people (Scott-Morton, 1991). As 
illustrated in Figure 3, the misalignments between the two knowledge systems are those 
practices, with regard to strategy, structure, process and people.  













Secondly, the recipient organization needs to consider whether it is feasible to make 
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adaptations. Both the practices in the source company (a proxy to the technology) and 
in the recipient organization are contextually embedded (Orlikowski et al., 1995; 
Kostova, 1999). Before making adaptations, the recipient organization needs to 
examine the interplay between the practices and the contexts If the practices are 
deeply embedded in the contexts, the recipient organization has to be aware that no 
matter how much energy it devote to the adaptation process, it may not be possible to 
revise or more troubles will emerge after the practices are adapted.  
To examine how practices are embedded in the context, I propose a three-level 
framework, referring to Kostova’s (1999) idea. I consider three types of context: 
individual, organizational and societal. As illustrated in Figure 4. Compared with 
Kostova’s framework, which is only for analyzing transfer process between parent 
company and subsidiaries in MNCs, this framework is more generalizable. It can help 
organization to analyze the interplay between practices and contexts in most 
technology transfer and technology adoption case.  
In the individual level, I suggest that the recipient organization needs to consider 
users’ technology frame and learning ability. After adopting a new technology, users in 
the recipient organization may adapt their original work practice and learn new 
knowledge. Their previous experiences with technology and learning ability will 
influence their opinions toward and acceptance of the new technology. For example, in 
SkyAir’s case, to use MROsys, SkyAir’s engineers need to adapt their collaborating 
practices from sequential pattern to overlapping pattern. Such an adaptation requires 
SkyAir’s engineers to extend their maintenance knowledge. Meanwhile, in SkyAir’s 
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purchasing practice, purchasers were reluctant to use MROsys because they believed 
that using MROsys would increase the risk of being fired. Either extending engineers’ 
maintenance knowledge or changing purchasers’ opinions toward MROsys requires a 
fundamental change in social education systems and social infrastructure.  
















How practices are embedded in the contexts
In the organizational level, I suggest that the recipient organization needs to consider its 
operation capacity and organizational culture. Before adopting a technology, the 
organization needs to analyze whether their own organizing principles are compatible 
with those principles embedded in the technology (Zander & Kogut, 1995). The 
organizational practices may not be easily adapted because it is rooted in the 
organizational culture and operation capacity. For example, in SkyAir’s case, its 
 110
decentralized purchasing center structure is based on its operation capacity and 
bureaucratic organizational culture. It may be difficult for them to increase operational 
capacity or transform organizational culture without considering the industry structure 
and Chinese regulatory systems 
In the societal level, I suggest that the recipient organization needs to consider the 
social infrastructure, industry environment and regulatory system. Many organizational 
practices are socially embedded. For example, a business strategy may be influenced by 
the competition market and people’s collaborating practices are affected by the social 
education system. In SkyAir’s case, the dispatching practice is affected by the local 
aircraft industry and the government rules. The purchasing practice is affected by the 
local component market and social infrastructures. The collaborating practice is 
influenced by the education system. Although these practices were in conflict with 
GermanAir’s “best” practices, they were embedded in the Chinese institutional 
contexts. From social infrastructure, industry structure and regulatory system 
perspectives, the implementing organization can examine the interplay between their 
organizational practices and the societal context, and estimate whether these practices 
can be adapted.  
The two-step framework proposed in this study can help the recipient organization 
to examine whether it is feasible to make adaptations and estimate the possible 
adaptation outcome even before adopting a new technology. Based on the case analysis 
in this study, I suggest that if those practices needed to be adapted are deeply embedded 
in the individual, organizational and societal context, it would be better for the recipient 
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organization to reconsider their decision about adopting this technology because the 
further adaptation will encounter more challenges and cannot guarantee a successful 
outcome. 
Second, it is beyond the scope of this research to formulate a comprehensive 
solution for SkyAir to adapt the MROsys. But if we reflect on SkyAir’s situated context 
through Gidden’s (1990) “re-embedding” idea, we may identify three possible 
strategies to deal with the technology adaptation conundrum (as summarized in Table 
6). First, to adapt MROsys, which is embedded with standardized job-dispatching 
practices, SkyAir must build comprehensive maintenance databases for each 
customer’s aircrafts. This would require long-term relationships and global 
maintenance capabilities. Since it would not be easy to upgrade SkyAir’s operational 
capabilities over night, it would make sense for SkyAir to build standardization 
databases selectively and design task-based templates for its ad hoc customers. For 
example, there are a few mid-term customers who are relatively satisfied with SkyAir’s 
services and cannot afford premium maintenance fees. SkyAir could build 
comprehensive job-card templates for them and negotiate a joint development of 
system to minimize costs. For the transient customers, building a database for their 
aircrafts may not be cost-effective. SkyAir could build task templates according to the 
nine “maintenance blocks”. For SkyAir, the planning engineers could investigate the 
contingencies of maintenance works in different projects, and consolidate 
task-templates across the nine maintenance blocks in order to accommodate task 
specification changes requested from each customer. 
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Table 6: Practical Implication for Technology Adaptation in SkyAir 
Practices Re-innovated and Re-embed 
Planning Instead of building standardization database for each customer as what has been done 
in GermanAir, it would make sense for SkyAir to build standardization databases 
selectively and design task-based templates for its ad hoc customers. For example, 
there are a few mid-term customers who are relatively satisfied with SkyAir’s services 
and cannot afford premium maintenance fees. SkyAir could build comprehensive 
job-card templates for them and negotiate a joint development of system to minimize 
costs and increase profits. 
Buying Since it might not be feasible to restructure SkyAir’s decentralized purchasing 
organization at present time, it would make more sense for SkyAir to specify “total 
cost ownership” for each department and set up strategic alliances with reputable 
market makers. For example, SkyAir could redesign MROsys to support virtual 
centralization, which is to consolidate purchasing items and display all requested 
product categories through an electronic marketplace (such as an eBay website). This 
would make sourcing engineers to allocate resources more effectively. Meanwhile, to 
prevent buying components from clone market, SkyAir may collaborate with 
established market agents to consolidate second-hand components from original 
equipment manufacturers. 
Executing Since it may bring a disaster to SkyAir if they revise the sequential collaboration 
pattern at current time, it would be reasonable for SkyAir to maintain sequential 
collaboration model so as to leverage repair works and avoid immediate confusions 
among technicians. For example, currently SkyAir’s technicians have sporadic Level 
1-3 skills. In this way, those technicians who are responsible to shop-floor cleaning 
may not know how to unscrew electronic sockets, and those who can unscrew 
electronic sockets may not know how to fix light bulbs. If these technicians could be 
gathered and re-trained collectively for all Level 1-3 skills, they may form taskforce 
teams to standby and support a maintenance project while swiftly move to another 
project, which can greatly improve work efficiency and reduce projects’ 
turn-around-time. 
Secondly, to adapt MROsys, which is embedded with autonomous decision-making 
model and cost-center principles, SkyAir may need to fundamentally transform its 
organizational structure, power relationship and even the Chinese components market. 
Since it might not be feasible to restructure SkyAir’s decentralized purchasing 
organization at present time, it would make more sense for SkyAir to specify “total cost 
ownership” for each department and set up strategic alliances with reputable market 
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makers. For example, SkyAir could redesign MROsys to support virtual centralization, 
which is to consolidate purchasing items and display all requested product categories 
through an electronic marketplace (such as an eBay website). This would make 
sourcing engineers to allocate resources more effectively. The consolidation of 
purchasing information could also help identify the total costs derived from each 
department. Meanwhile, since it is impossible for SkyAir to regulate the Chinese 
component market, it could set up alliances with reputable market makers based in 
China (e.g. Global Sources) to consolidate second-hand components from original 
equipment manufacturers. This would avoid purchasing components from overseas 
suppliers, as domestic purchasing would shorten lead time (custom clearance in China 
could cause severe delay), reduce costs, and prevent purchasing parts from the clone 
market. The market maker could work with sourcing engineers to prepare necessary 
documents for facilitating the bureaucratic decision-making processes. 
Thirdly, to adapt MROsys, which is embedded with overlapping collaboration 
model, SkyAir must revamp its competence structure and reduce its head counts. Since 
it might not be practical to adjust both the instructional methods and salary scale in light 
of SkyAir’s present situation, it would be reasonable for SkyAir to maintain sequential 
collaboration model so as to leverage repair works and avoid immediate confusions 
among technicians. For example, currently SkyAir’s technicians have sporadic Level 
1-3 skills. In this way, those technicians who are responsible to shop-floor cleaning may 
not know how to unscrew electronic sockets, and those who can unscrew electronic 
sockets may not know how to fix light bulbs. If these technicians could be gathered and 
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re-trained collectively for all Level 1-3 skills, they may form taskforce teams to standby 
and support a maintenance project while swiftly move to another project, which can 
greatly improve work efficiency and reduce projects’ turn-around-time. 
Although these solutions require further refinements, they provide a good reference 
to think about how to re-embed generalized practices into a local context. The 
underlying message is to advocate that adapting a new technology is an occasion of 
knowledge transfer. It would be unwise for the recipient to replicate the source’s 
practices or engage in mutual adaptation (package modification or organizational 
adjustment) without considering the complicated implication of situated context. As 
this study shows, when technology is transferred to a heterogeneous context, the 
knowledge system situated in the recipient’s context may not be “adapted” readily. 
Technology adaptation cannot be effective achieved by means of removing contextual 
barriers or accommodating technological functions to local practices. Instead, the 
implementer should attempt to re-embed the generalized practices into local context 
through innovative solutions that take into account of situated context. 
6.3. Limitations 
Unquestionably, technology adaptation and organizational restructuring are so 
complex that require a rigorous research method to fully understand them. Even 
though this study has made an important step toward such understandings, I recognize 
this study also has a few limitations. 
First of all, due to time and financial constraints, I cannot do ethnographic 
fieldwork in GermanAir. However, to provide authentic qualitative data, I have 
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interviewed several German expatriates to understand the practices and contexts in 
GermanAir. Also, by visiting a GermanAir’s affiliated MRO company in Singapore 
and interviewing several maintenance experts, I can understand maintenance practices 
in GermanAir. 
Secondly, researchers tend to question the generalizability of qualitative research, 
especially when the research uses only one case-analysis. However, the 
generalizability of qualitative research is not based on sampling logic, but rather on a 
new theoretical perspective. In other words, the purpose of my study was not to 
provide certain common actions which organizations should take during technology 
adaptation process, but rather to highlight the importance of transferring knowledge 
and the influence of situated context in technology adaptation. The theoretical lens of 
analyzing technology adaptation from a knowledge transfer perspective and 
examining the context influence in the adaptation process is generalizable to other 
studies.  
Thirdly, suggested by some professors, if I can provide another successful 
technology adaptation case which examines two companies situated in similar 
contexts, the study may become more convincing and meaningful. However, due to 
time and length constraints, I may not be able to provide analyze another case study 
using the same perspective. Despite this limitation, I am confident the thorough 
analysis in my study can provide new insights to this technology adaptation and 
adoption field. 
In summary, this study has contributed to the existing body of literature on 
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technology adaptation, through an analysis of practices and situated context. However, 
to understand, manage and achieve successful technology adaptation is far from over. 
Therefore, as an IS researcher, I have an obligation to continue to analyze the 
dynamic interactions between technology and organization, and consider this study as 
part of the early steps in achieving this goal.  
6.4. Conclusion 
This study proposes an alternative perspective to analyze technology adaptation. It 
conceptualizes technology adaptation as a process of knowledge transfer in which the 
recipient learns how to apply the knowledge system in the technology to their own 
pre-established knowledge system. Technology adaptation difficulties are examined 
through problems arising from the recipient’s attempt to transfer the practices 
embedded in the information system into its existing organizational system. Meanwhile, 
this study examines how the practices embedded in the information system and the 
practices situated in the recipient organization are enacted from their own contexts. 
The contexts analysis could help us to understand why it is not easy for recipient 
organization to either customize technology or reconfigure its organization system to 
adapt the technology. Based on a case study of technology adaptation in an aircraft 
maintenance firm, this study suggests in a cross-national context, to successfully 
adapt an information system, the recipient organization may need to re-innovate its 
organizational practice and re-embed these practices into technology.  
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